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Abstract
Representing cognitive processes remains one of the great research challenges. Many important
application areas, such as clinical diagnosis, operate in an environment of relative magnitudes,
counts, shapes, colours, etc. which are not well captured by current representational approaches. This
paper presents conceptual spaces as a meso level representation for cognitive systems, between the
high level symbolic representations and the subconceptual connectionist representations which have
dominated AI. Conceptual spaces emphasize orders and measures and therefore naturally represent
counts, magnitudes, and volumes. Taking Gärdenfors’ decade-long investigation of conceptual
spaces [Gärdenfors, Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, MIT Press, 2000] as start point,
the paper presents a formal foundation for conceptual spaces, shows how they are theoretically and
practically linked to higher and lower representational levels, and develops dynamics which allow
the orbits of states in the space to solve appropriate meso level reasoning tasks. Interpretations
of conceptual spaces are given to illustrate the formal definitions and show the flexibility of the
representation.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Concept representation; Cognitive processing; Feature spaces; Dynamical systems; Knowledge
representation; Conceptual spaces; Representational levels; Categorisation; Prototypes; Conceptual distance
1. Introduction
Representing cognitive processes remains one of the great research challenges. Consider
the important area of clinical diagnosis, say, differentiating between iron deficiency
and anaemia due to leukaemia [35]. Symptoms are often mild, and include common
conditions such as increasing fatigue, lightheadedness, or palpitations. Clinical signs are
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also subtle—pallor, spoon-shaped finger nails, tongue texture, heartbeat irregularities and
so on. Laboratory tests look firstly at red blood cell counts and average volumes, then at cell
colour and shape. How well can this environment of relative magnitudes, shapes, colours
and counts be captured with current representational approaches?
Symbolic representations have dominated in application areas such as these, from
the early expert systems through to the current activity in medical ontologies and
terminological systems like the UMLS semantic network [32]. Automated neural networks
are applied in medical equipment monitoring, image recognition, and diagnosis systems
where, as with symbolic approaches, input is usually mid level feature vectors. The
anaemia differentiation problem would be amenable to either type of approach only after
extensive cognitive effort had been put into extracting and abstracting information.
This paper builds on Gärdenfors’ [15] development of conceptual spaces as a mid
level representation for cognitive systems, between connectionist and symbolic systems.
Conceptual spaces, as defined by Gärdenfors, emphasize orders and measures and therefore
naturally represent counts and magnitudes, which are so much of the fabric of cognition.
The paper’s contributions are
(a) a formal foundation for conceptual spaces,
(b) a demonstration of how conceptual spaces are theoretically and practically linked to
higher and lower representational levels, and
(c) the development of dynamics which allow states to represent complex structures,
and the orbits of states to solve appropriate “meso level” reasoning tasks, including
categorisation.
1.1. Cognitive systems
Representations are sometimes defined to be substates of a cognitive system that
support the system’s purposeful interaction with its environment (e.g., [11,26]). Although
representations may have physical realisations, they are not required to have them: that
is, representation may be an abstract modelling tool used to describe mental activities
of organisms or activities of artificial systems. Whether just a descriptive tool, or whether
physically realised, representations are goal-directed abstractions of an environment which
can itself be natural or constructed, or a combination.
For the system’s interactions with its environment to be non-accidental, the state of the
external environment must be able to affect the state of the system. That is, there must be
some perceptual input mechanism, as when the clinician observes the anaemia signs. For
the achievement of the goals of the system to be linked to the state of the environment,
these goals must depend on differentiation amongst states and identification of states. So
the representations must make distinctions between relevant states or sets of states of the
environment.
Since the physical environment is comprised of (externally) measurable forces and
constituents—heart rate, average size of red blood cells, aircraft speed, number of wings
etc.—the system must be capable of approximating both magnitudes and counts in its
representations. In biological and artificial systems this occurs in the accumulated activity
of units in selected subsystems, in the case of magnitude, and in the count of selected
active subsystems, in the case of count (e.g., [10]). A very direct example of representation
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Fig. 1. Schematic of conceptual spaces as a meso level representation form, which can be viewed as having
inputs from “lower level” (subconceptual) and “higher level” (symbolic) systems, analogously to meso level
representations in physics. The structuring of conceptual spaces into symbol and concept spaces with an attention
buffer is described in Section 4. Symbol space is described there as being a vector space, where each component
of a vector represents the activity of a “symbol” or label. The dynamics of the meso level system, including the
setting of the attention buffer and the type 1 and type 2 state transitions, are described in Section 5.
of magnitudes is provided in van Gelder and Port’s [42] description of Watt’s steam
engine governor as a system with goal-directed interaction with the environment: here,
the environmental measurable of pressure determines the state of the system.
This paper considers systems that also interact with other systems through a symbol-
based subsystem, as the clinician does talking with the patient. A pressure setting and
display device would be an example of such a subsystem with which Watt’s governor
could communicate with humans. For the interaction to be meaningful, the system must
be dependable in the way its internal states are associated with the symbols or tokens it
presents externally, and in its reactions, given its internal state, to the symbols it receives
from the external world. The system may also have a memory in which to store sequences
(programs) of commands to direct attention to parts of its representations, so that a single
change in the symbol-based subsystem can result in a sequence of operations to transform
the system’s state. Fig. 1 provides a schematic of the system described in this paper.
Cognitive research has been heavily influenced by, first, symbolic and, then, connec-
tionist representations (or more generally, by subconceptual representations as dynamical
systems). As Gärdenfors points out, pure symbolic systems operate with a realist seman-
tics that presume external representations. Mappings to the external world are needed to
provide symbols with their relationship to the environment. Without such mappings, for ex-
ample, magnitude and count are only formally available through infinite constructions, al-
though they are used in quantities, probabilities and the like, through informally co-opting
arithmetic. On the other hand, connectionist representations focus on processing input at
the perceptual level and generally have weak links between the perceptual input and the
symbolic level. Artificial neural net systems designed for high level output usually have
input which must be interpreted at a high level, e.g., classification systems for medical
diagnosis.
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Some connectionist systems distinguish two sets of nodes, in which the nodes of one
set, call it the higher level, are considered to be symbols which are associated with patterns
of activity in the second set (e.g., [5,29]). They can be interpreted as implementations
of the conceptual systems described below. However, they are but examples, without an
equivalent theory based on geometry. There has been a theoretical gap between the two
main AI representational forms, symbolic and connectionist. The fact that systems are
rarely if ever implemented as pure connectionist or pure symbolic systems—because, for
example, they incorporate digital arithmetic units or electronic sensing devices, or because
they are hybrid systems—encourages the development of the meso level theory.
1.2. Structure of cognitive representations
A recurring feature of cognitive mechanisms used to differentiate and identify states of
the environment is the assignment of properties to sets of substates variously called objects
and concepts. Kirsch says: “It means that the creature is able to identify the common
property which two or more objects share and to entertain the possibility that other objects
also possess that property. That is, to have a concept is, among other things, to have a
capacity to find an invariance across a range of contexts, and to reify that invariance so
that it can be combined with other appropriate invariances” [24].
Dimensions and domains form the framework used to assign properties to concepts and
objects, and to specify relations between them. Because basic concepts are not always
independent of each other, interdependent concepts are usefully organised into domains.
Domains might be derived from the perceptual mechanism primarily responsible for the
information, from associations learned through feedback from the environment, or might
be ascribed internally by the system. Thus colour concepts belong to one domain, concepts
for sounds to a second, company ownership relations to a third, and so on. There is ample
support from neurophysiology and neuropsychology for domain-specificity in the brain,
whether innate or built up through experience (e.g., [33,41]).
Domains in turn are composed of dimensions, the primary function of which is to
represent various “qualities” of situations or objects. Examples of quality dimensions are
sensory-derived qualities such as temperature or the three ordinary spatial dimensions of
height, width and depth; qualities of an abstract non-sensory character, such as integrity or
popularity; or internally derived qualities such as level of fatigue or fear.
Differentiation and identification require judgements about the similarity of states. In
the context of such judgments, Shepard and Chipman [37] say of representation that
“isomorphism should be sought—not in the first order relation between (a) an individual
object and (b) its corresponding internal representation—but in the second order relation
between (a) the relations among external objects, and (b) the relations among their
corresponding internal representations”. Relations amongst representation of objects and
concepts will be determined by betweenness and distance relations on quality dimensions,
as discussed in Section 3.
A conceptual space is in essence a multidimensional space in which the dimensions
represent qualities or features of that which is being represented. A point in the space is a
state in the associated conceptual system. Gärdenfors’ primary motivation for introducing
conceptual spaces was to provide new tools for manipulating explicit representations of
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concepts. Geometry provides representational capacities and analysis tools not naturally
available in the connectionist and symbolic representational forms. Some phenomena, such
as the symptoms, signs and tests of anaemia, are more easily and accurately modelled at
the conceptual level. Although geometry has been exploited in specialised representations,
instance based learning for example, the vector space structure often assumed is neither
necessary, nor always appropriate.
Conceptual representations can be taken to be the references of symbols, and to receive
perceptually-derived input. As such, the conceptual level is naturally seen to lie between
the symbolic and the subconceptual levels. The development of conceptual spaces as a
generic mechanism for representation and reasoning—in partnership with these and other
representational forms—may be as important as meso level modelling has proved to be in
atmospheric physics, economics, neurobiology and so on.
1.3. About this paper
At the outset, it is not at all obvious how to best formulate a conceptual space or to
embed objects in such a space. However, for an intermediate or meso level representation
between the symbolic and the connectionist levels to be useful, its links to these levels
should be clearly defined. It ought to be able to represent relations and structure other than
properties. How the environment influences the conceptual system and how the symbols
relate to the states need to be spelt out. The dynamics of goal-directed state changes in the
space must be described.
This paper does these things. Section 2 summarises the argument for a meso level
conceptual representation which was presented in Gärdenfors [15]. A comparison of
alternative formulations of conceptual spaces requires them to be formally articulated.
Section 3 presents definitions and results involving betweenness and distance, which
provide important tools without assuming a Euclidean or even an additive structure.
Section 4 applies the tools to formal definitions of the spaces and their constructs, taking
guidance from findings on human conceptualisation. Section 5 introduces dynamics, which
can be phrased in terms of dynamical systems, as a conceptual manipulation language using
rules of association, or, in some circumstances, as manipulations of vectors. In each case,
the trajectories of states can be described. These trajectories can lead to states representing
complex structures and relations. Problem solving at the conceptual level reduces to micro-
steps of composition and differentiation. Section 6 gives examples of conceptual spaces
according to our definition. First, an example of dynamical systems is re-cast into the
conceptual space framework. Then high dimensional quasi-Euclidean spaces in which
generalisation is the main reasoning activity are presented, after Gärdenfors. Section 7
summarises and looks to further work and applications.
2. Gärdenfors’ argument for a meso level conceptual space
This section justifies the development of a theory of representation at a level between the
connectionist and the symbolic, and is drawn from Gärdenfors [15]. Also, see [13,14,16].
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2.1. Symbolic representation
The crucial question Gärdenfors puts for any theory of representation is how concepts
are to be modelled. On the symbolic level, basic concepts are in fact not modelled,
rather, they are named by the basic symbols. Names of more complex concepts are then
constructed by compositions—logical or syntactical—of the simple names. When the
symbols are used for modelling logical inference, the expressions represent propositions,
and a state is defined by the various logical relations among symbols. Information is
processed by computing the consequences of these relations, using some set of inference
rules. When symbols are used for syntactical parsing in language, strings of them
are processed by different kinds of automata according to a recursive set of recursive
grammatical rules. The material basis for the symbolic processes is irrelevant to the
description of their results. Although symbolic sentences are assumed derived from inputs
from sensory channels, the system merely performs logical operations on them.
In order to achieve its goals, a successful system is likely to have to not only form new
combinations of the given symbols, but also to learn new properties from its interactions
with the environment. It should be able to evolve the meaning of a concept as a result
of new experiences. Changes in meaning of concepts, and development of new concepts,
cannot be easily represented in formal logic systems. Concept formation techniques, such
as predicate invention using inverse resolution, are based on the syntactic form of the
background knowledge and observed examples: they rely on previous interpretation of the
existing symbols. The underlying difficulty is the symbol grounding problem, expressed by
Harnad [20] as follows: “How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system
be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads?
How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis
of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols?”.
Notions of similarity and distance, which are instrumental in differentiation and
identification, are difficult to model in a natural way in a symbolic system. As Quine says,
“ [One] cannot easily imagine a more familiar or fundamental notion than [similarity], or
a notion more ubiquitous in its application. On this score it is like the notions of logic: like
identity, negation, alternation, and the rest. And yet, strangely, there is something logically
repugnant about it. For we are baffled when we try to relate the general notion of similarity
significantly to logical terms” [34].
Symbolic systems are particularly vulnerable to the frame problem, that is, the
specification of what in the system’s representation of the environment changes and what
stays constant. This is partly because causality is not represented in first order logic.
Gärdenfors also points out that the combinatorial explosion of symbolic representations of
a changing world is a result of not keeping symbolic information about different domains
separated.
A final problem area for symbolic systems relates to induction. If logical relations alone
are used to determine which inductions are useful, the fact that all predicates are treated on
an equal footing induces symmetries which are not preserved by our understanding of the
inductions. “Raven” is treated on the same footing as “non-raven” in Hempel’s [21] famous
example, or “green” with “grue”—the colour green till the year 2000 then blue thereafter—
in Goodman’s riddle of induction [18]. While induction treats certain predicates as being
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provided from the environment, the fact that the atomic predicates are taken as granted
from the beginning means that much inductive processing has already been performed.
2.2. Connectionist/subconceptual representations
In connectionism, representations are via the dynamics of the patterns of activities in
artificial neuron networks (ANNs), which form multi-dimensional representations. The
activity of each neuron can be considered as a quality of a dimension. This way of looking
at ANNs is sometimes called the state space approach. The activity of an ANN can then
be represented as a vector. However, this kind of representation is, in general, different
from the one studied on the conceptual level. The basic difference is that perceptually-
derived information received by the receptors is tremendously rich and unstructured, and
so the ANN must have complex nodal structures to transform it into a form that can
be handled on the conceptual or symbolic level. Thus the state space of an ANN is of
much higher dimensionality than at the conceptual level. ANNs may employ distributed
representations to allow a more parsimonious structure, but this creates problems with
accuracy of representation. On the conceptual level, in contrast, irrelevant information has
been filtered out.
Furthermore, the metrics of the spaces on the conceptual level are in general simple in
comparison to the very complex distance metrics employed by an ANN after it has been
trained. In a connectionist system, distance may appear as an emergent feature, but is hard
to model on a neuronal level. ANNs learn about similarities slowly and only after tailored
training. Gärdenfors concedes that networks can be made more efficient by building in
structural constraints when setting up the architecture of the network. However, he points
out that this means that information about the relevant parts of the environment is designed
into the network: the strategy presumes what we are calling the conceptual level in the very
construction of the network. The representation may not be able to deal with a changing
environment.
How then is the transition from the subconceptual through to the symbolic level to be
made? There are systems, like ART, that perform dimensionality reduction, and which
realise our notion of a conceptual space. The fundamental epistemological problem,
Gärdenfors claims, is that even if the network has learned to categorise the input in the
right way, it is not possible to describe what the emerging network represents because
concepts are represented implicitly. There is no theory of neural networks to bridge the
gap between the subconceptual and conceptual level.
2.3. Conceptual spaces
As we have said, a conceptual space is defined through a number of quality dimensions,
and can for the moment be considered to be a multidimensional space (although it will
be shown later to be much more). There is no unique way of choosing a dimension to
represent a particular quality of the environment, even given a fixed set of perceptual input
mechanisms. For example, human perception of taste appears to be generated from four
distinct types of receptors: salt, sour, sweet, and bitter. The quality space representing
tastes is often described as a 4-dimensional space—one such model proposed by Henning
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in 1916 was of a gustatory space described as a tetrahedron—but, as with colour space,
there are alternative models. An individual operates with their own set of dimensions and
construction of conceptual space.
Conceptual spaces address the symbol grounding problem by giving symbols and
expressions meaning via their connection to constructions in the space, such as properties
and objects and the like. The form of the connections is discussed in Section 4. The
assignment of meanings to the expressions on the symbolic level is therefore not arbitrary,
but constrained by the underlying conceptual structure. Such a linkage is a principle of
cognitive linguists [23]. Unlike a realist semantics, the resulting semantics do not presume
any objects outside the cognitive structure to determine the meaning of symbols; of course,
there may be referents external to the cognitive system.
Conceptual spaces provide a natural way of representing similarities, and relations of
similarity play a crucial role in problem solving. The ability to compare things naturally is
one of the major advantages of the conceptual space representation. Similarity judgements
made by humans (and in many experiments, by animals) shed light on the structure of
quality dimensions that individuals invoke in their conceptualisation of their environment.
The similarity between two objects is agreed to be a function of (context-dependent)
distance (e.g., [27]). If objects are represented as points in a conceptual space, then, roughly
speaking, the similarity of two objects can be defined via the distance between the points
that represent them in the space. Even abstract qualities may have a meaningful notion of
distance. The phylogenetic classification of animals makes it meaningful to say that birds
and reptiles are more closely related than reptiles and mammals. Relative distances can be
assigned to emotional qualities, such as abhorrence as compared with hatred as compared
with dislike. The minimal non-trivial structure we will require is a betweenness relation on
dimensions, which is used to define regions and connectedness.
The theory of conceptual spaces may also indicate the direction to a solution to the frame
problem. The basis is the separation into domains of the information to be represented.
Finally, the question of where to direct attention is closely related to overlap of regions of
interest and thus to the geometry of the conceptual space.
3. Preliminaries
This section presents notation and definitions needed to formally define properties,
objects and distances, which are the foundations of conceptual spaces. The important
role similarity assessment plays in human reasoning motivates the formal setting of metric
spaces. Metric spaces generalise the vector spaces or orthogonal feature spaces frequently
assumed in cognitive science and machine learning.
Throughout we will work within the mathematical category of pointed metric spaces,
that is, sets with a distance function 1 d and with a distinguished point, denoted ∗, which is
also known as “the point at infinity” because d(a,∗)=∞ for all a = ∗ in the space. This
means that all spaces are taken to be pointed metric spaces, and all maps are taken to be
1 That is, a bivariate, non-negative, real valued, symmetric function d such that for any x,y and z, d(x, y)= 0
if and only if x = y, and d(x, y) d(x, z)+ d(y, z).
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continuous and to map distinguished points to distinguished points. Distinguished points
are a device to allow data to be “not applicable” or “not available”, as described below.
Constructing representations in terms of metric spaces rather than sets does not
necessarily either constrain or add meaningful structure to them. Any set can be equipped
with the discrete 0-1 metric which defines the distance between a point and itself to be
zero and distances to other non-distinguished points to be 1. This trivial metric says that
individual points can be distinguished, but cannot otherwise be compared: it is often
implicitly applied, for example when nominal attributes are used in inductive learning
algorithms. Defining conceptual spaces to be metric spaces embeds similarity comparisons
into the structure, and constrains the maps used in the conceptual constructions in a sensible
way. It also allows maps between conceptualisations to be defined in a sensible way,
although we do not have the space to pursue these here.
A point-wise metric d can be extended to sets in a metric space through the Hausdorff
distance dH which, given two regions A and B , is defined by





This construct is usual when going from a metric defined on points to one defined on
subsets because it is a true metric, unlike the minimum separation distance which is
a pseudometric when applied to intersecting sets. Use of the metric dH will allow us
to talk about the distance between properties and other constructs in conceptual space.
Fig. 2 illustrates for a two dimensional Euclidean domain. In this example, the sets “tall
& heavy” and “medium size” overlap: for instance, these might refer to children of a
certain age, where additional factors such as bone structure alter the categorisation of size.
Nevertheless, the distance between the concepts of a tall and heavy 10-year old and a
medium size 10-year is intuitively not zero. The Hausdorff distance accommodates this, in
this example setting the distance to be that between the lightest of the shortest “medium
size” children and the lightest “tall & heavy” child.
Straight lines are fundamental to geometry. Although in Euclidean spaces the metric
can be used to define lines, defining them this way is not always useful. In the following,
Fig. 2. Distance between connected sets in a size domain. See text.
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betweenness is therefore introduced, and becomes a crucial geometrical tool, alongside
distance. Betweenness is related to, but weaker than, partial order. 2 We nevertheless
use it to define the key notions of connectivity and convexity without recourse to the
metric. Connectivity and convexity in turn are used in Section 4 in defining properties and
prototypes, the latter being points which, in some sense, summarise concepts. We suggest
in Section 4 that properties can be formed by partitioning a space into convex sets, each
containing a prespecified prototypical point. Here, we show this can be done for arbitrary
metric spaces if a boundary set is allowed. To form prototypes, a sensible notion of a
centroid is required even when there is no addition defined on a space. We present this at
the end of Section 1. The second subsection of this section formally defines dimensions,
domains and symbols.
3.1. Betweenness
Important structure on dimensions is provided by a betweenness relation. Given any
two aspects of a representation, a third may or may not be “between” the first two.
Betweenness is therefore a trivariate truth valued function. Betweenness is a conceptually
ubiquitous notion, which the clinician may use in interpreting the significance of the shape
of the patient’s fingernails, their pallor, or their entire demeanour. Betweenness is a weak
structural requirement, for example defined naturally on graphs when a node is on a path
between two other nodes.
In Euclidean space, betweenness normally takes its everyday meaning, that is, it is
defined in terms of the distance metric by B(a, b, c)⇔ d(a, c) = d(a, b)+ d(b, c). On
the other hand, sometimes the betweenness relation defined this way is uninteresting (e.g.,
nothing is between anything). For example, betweenness relations are always empty when
they are defined using the discrete 0–1 metric, such as might be applied to a nominal set of
fruit types {apple, orange, rock melon, pineapple, banana}. Yet complex subjective notions
of taste and appearance, say, might allow some of the fruits to be related by betweenness.
Motivation for loosening the coupling of the metric and betweenness also comes from
the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1.1. Betweenness defined via metrics is not preserved under isomorphisms
in the category of pointed metric spaces.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose a given metric d on a set D induces a non-trivial
betweenness relation B(a, b, c)⇔ d(a, c) = d(a, b) + d(b, c). Define d’ by d ′(a, b) =
(d(a, b))1/2 for all a, b ∈D. Then it is easy to show that d’ is a metric and that the identity
map between the metric spaces (D,d) and (D,d ′) is continuous in both directions, so that
they are isomorphic. Suppose B ′ is the betweenness relation defined using d ′. Then, for
2 Given a partial order > on D − {∗} and a relation B defined on D ×D × D by B(a,b, c) if and only if
a > b > c or c > b > a, then it is easy to see that B satisfies parts (a) to (d) of Definition 3.1.2. However,
a betweenness relation does not necessarily define a partial order: Consider a graph shaped as a “Y” with
betweenness inherited from the usual ordering on a line. Given points a and c on the arms of the “Y”, b at the
junction, and d at the foot, then B(a,b, c),B(a, b, d) and B(c,b, d). It is not possible to convert these relations
into expressions of the form a < b < c or a > b > c without arriving at a contradiction.
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any distinct a, b, c ∈D,B ′(a, b, c)= 1 implies (d(a, c))1/2 = (d(a, b))1/2 + (d(b, c))1/2
so that d(a, c) = d(a, b)+ d(b, c)+ 2(d(a, b)d(b, c))1/2 > d(a, c) as d is a metric and
a = b and b = c. This contradiction shows that B ′(a, b, c) = 0 and hence, B ′ must be
trivial. ✷
Borsuk and Szmielew [4] presented a set of axioms that deliver the conventional notion
of betweenness on Euclidean spaces. We introduce a further two axioms, 3.1.2(e) and
(f), to respectively cater for distinguished points and to provide coherence between the
geometry associated with the metric and the betweenness relation. Axiom (f) ensures that
betweenness is at least as rich as the metric space definition.
Definition 3.1.2 (Betweenness). A betweenness relationship B on a space D with metric
d is a logical relation B on D ×D ×D such that for arbitrary a, b, c ∈D,
(a) B(a, b, c)⇒ a = b, a = c, b = c;
(b) B(a, b, c)⇒ B(c, b, a);B(a, c, b)⇒ notB(c, a, b);
(c) B(a, b, c)& B(b, c, d)⇒ B(a, b, d);
(d) B(a, b, d)& B(b, c, d)⇒ B(a, b, c);
(e) notB(a, b,∗) & notB(a,∗, b) & notB(∗, a, b) for all a, b ∈D;
(f) d(a, c)= d(a, b)+ d(b, c)⇒ B(a, b, c).
The set of points x satisfying B(a, x, b) can be said to form a line or a path between
a and b. The second condition in (b) ensures there are no cycles, such as the circle with
its usual local notion of betweenness. However, there can be multiple paths between two
points.
Connectivity and convexity are important descriptors of the natural environment,
because primitive entities are almost always perceived to be spatially connected, and, often,
to be convex, while primitive events are seen to be temporally connected and hence convex
in uni-dimensional time. Connectivity and convexity are therefore important in conceptual
space constructions. The next definition defines convexity in terms of betweenness, and
defines regions as connected sets. Connectivity is defined in a non-standard way using the
betweenness relation that allows some finite sets to be connected. 3
Definition 3.1.3 (Regions, connectivity and convexity).
(a) A space A is called r-convex if it is a singleton or if for any pair a = c0, b = cr ∈A,
there exist r − 1 elements c1, c2, . . . , cr−1 ∈ A such that B(ci , x, ci+1)⇒ x ∈ A.
A 1-convex space is called convex. It is easy to see that if A and A′ are convex, then
so is A∩A′.
(b) The convex closure of the set A is the smallest convex set containing A. The
construction of such a set is described in Definition 3.1.5.
3 A connected set A is usually defined to be one in which, given arbitrary a,b in A, there is a continuous map
f from the unit interval into A such that f (0)= a and f (1)= b. Definition 3.1.3 excludes some sets which are
connected under the usual definition, such as curved lines in Euclidean 2-space. However, these are limit points of
sequences of connected sets. That is, if A is connected according to the usual definition, there exist An , connected
under 3.1.3, such that limn→∞ sup{inf{d(a, b): a ∈An,b ∈A}} = 0.
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(c) A subset A of a space D with a betweenness relation B is said to be connected if
(i) it is a singleton, or
(ii) for any pair a, b ∈ A, for some n > 0 there is a sequence c0 = a, c1, c2, . . . ,
cn−1, cn = b ∈A such that B(ci, x, ci+1)⇒ x ∈A.
(d) A region of D is a connected closed subspace of D.
Under its usual definition of convexity, any Euclidean space can be divided into a set
of n convex regions, disjoint except at boundaries, where the ith region is chosen to
contain a pre-specified point xi . This is done in a process called Voronoi Tessellation,
which assigns points in the space to the ith region if and only if xi is the closest of the pre-
specified points (see, for example, [28]). Without distance, such a neat construction is not
possible. However our definition of convexity using betweenness needs to support a similar
tessellation in any domain, which will partition a Euclidean space into conventionally
convex sets if the usual notion of betweenness applies.
Standard Voronoi tessellation involves boundary points which are assigned to more than
one of the convex sets. In this case, boundaries are hyperplanes in the Euclidean space. The
general boundary between convex sets is more interesting, and can support indeterminacy
in assigning points to regions. To motivate the definition of a boundary, we first present an
example. Then we prove that a tessellation can always be constructed so that pre-specified
points belong to mutually disjoint convex regions which cover the space, apart from a
boundary set.
Example 3.1.4. There is a set with a betweenness relation which cannot be partitioned
into two non-empty convex sets.
Let S = {Anne,Belinda,Carol,Bob,Tom,T0,T1,T2,T3} have the following between-
ness relations:
B(Belinda,Bob,Carol), B(Belinda,Tom,Carol), B(Bob,Anne,Tom) (3.1)
B(Carol,T0,Anne), B(Carol,T1,Anne), B(T0,Belinda,T1) (3.2)
B(Anne,T2,Belinda), B(Anne,T3,Belinda), B(T2,Carol,T3) (3.3)
It is straightforward to check that these relations satisfy the definition of a betweenness
relation. (The betweenness relation might refer to relative “reliability”; Anne, Belinda,
Carol, Bob and Tom might be general practitioners, and T0, T1, T2, T3 might be medical
tests.)
The proof that S cannot be partitioned as described starts by assuming that S is
partitioned into two sets, and shows that if convexity is preserved, all the elements of
the set are forced to belong to one set. That is, the other set is empty and the partition
is trivial. Name the two sets Reliable and Unreliable respectively. Two of the elements
Anne, Belinda, Carol must belong to the same set, say Belinda, Carol are Reliable Now
we show that all other elements are Reliable. By convexity, Belinda, Carol ∈ Reliable⇒
Bob,Tom ∈ Reliable from (3.1). Then Bob,Tom ∈ Reliable⇒ Anne ∈ Reliable from (3.1).
Now that Anne, Belinda and Carol are all Reliable it follows from (3.2) and (3.3) that
the remaining elements T0, T1, T2, T3 are also. Clearly, the same argument follows if we
started by assuming that Anne and Belinda are Reliable or Carol and Anne are Reliable.
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So, if the set S is to be partitioned into 2 convex sets because Anne is Unreliable and
Belinda is Reliable, what can be done? Suppose the element Carol is judged Reliable.
Then in order to maintain convexity, Tom and Bob must be added to this set, and hence
Anne would have to be added—but she is Unreliable. Similarly, Carol cannot be added in
with Anne. So Carol must be a boundary point. This suggests the nature of the boundary
of a partition of sets, as those points which cannot be included in the convex sets without
causing a violation of convexity. Points in the boundary can be grouped according to the
betweenness relations they have, to give the boundary a structure we do not explore further
here. Boundary points are fuzzy in the sense that they can be viewed as belonging to
more than one grouping, which might occur, for example, if Carol is judged as reliable
in comparisons involving doctors and tests, but is unreliable in comparisons involving
doctors.
Definition 3.1.5. Assume a partition of the set A into sets E,A1, . . . ,AN . Then the set E
is a boundary of the sets Ai if for every element x ∈E there is not a set Ai for which the
convex closure of Ai ∪ {x} remains disjoint from ⋃i =j Aj .
Before going on to our main theorem, we present a construction of the convex closure of
an arbitrary set which will be used in the proof. The theorem proof will be by construction,
assuming the Axiom of Choice and using transfinite induction, ie. induction past the usual
countable infinite sequence [43]. 4
Construction 3.1.6 (of the convex closure of an arbitrary set). Given the set S, we
construct a convex set S′ such that S ⊆ S′ and for every convex set S′′, if S ⊆ S′′ then
S′ ⊆ S′′. We do this by inductively constructing sets Sn such that S ⊆ Sn and⋃{Sn: n 0}
is convex. Put S0 = S and for each n  0 put Sn+1 = {x: x ∈ Sn or B(s, x, t) for some
s, t ∈ Sn}. Put S′ = ⋃{Sn: n  0}. We show S′ is convex. Let a, b ∈ S′ and suppose
there is x such that B(a, x, b). Each element a, b must appear in S0 or one of the Sn+1
constructions, after which they remain. Choose k to be the maximum of these two numbers,
that is, a, b ∈ Sk . Then x ∈ Sk+1 and so x ∈ S′. It remains to show that S′ is the smallest
such set, that is, S′ ⊆ S′′. This follows from the observation that each Sn ⊆ S′′ since at
every n all the elements of Sn are necessary for S′′ to be convex.
To gain insight into the following theorem, consider the case of a set S = size in
Euclidean 2-space, with, say, 3 points which have been assessed as respectively being
small, medium and large. Fig. 3 illustrates. To partition the set into 3 disjoint convex sets
with boundaries requires defining 3 straight lines across the set which separate the points.
In a Voronoi Tessellation this is done by defining the boundaries to be the points which are
equi-distant from at least two of the pre-specified points. This construction, however, does
not produce convex sets in general non-Euclidean spaces in which the betweenness and the
distance function are de-coupled. In the construction of the proof below, therefore, convex
4 Although transfinite techniques are common in mathematical logic, they are unusual in AI and cognitive
science because, although constructive, they are not computable except on finite sets. However, the aim of the
theorem is to guarantee the existence of such partitions, not to construct them.
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Fig. 3. Example of the tessellation of a space about prescribed points. Three convex sets A(small),A(medium)
and A(large) are grown about pre-designated points small, medium and large, shown as the centres of the solid
circles. The numbered points indicate the order in which the points 1–8 have been considered. For a point to be
added to a convex set, the convex closure must not intersect the other convex sets. The points 1–3 can be added
to arbitrary sets A(x). In this example, points 1 and 2 are added to A(small), and point 3 to A(medium). Point
4 cannot be added to A(small) without the convex closure intersecting the line medium-3; so in this example
it is added to A(large) although it could instead have been added to A(medium). Point 5 can only be added
to A(small), and so on. The dotted lines indicate the boundaries of the final tessellation. The position of the
boundaries depends on the (transfinite) ordering of the points in S. See proof of Theorem 3.1.7.
sets are “grown” about the pre-specified points by iteratively selecting an arbitrary point
and an arbitrary convex set and, if possible, adding all the points in the convex closure
of the selected set and point. When this cannot be done without intersecting some other
convex set, another set is selected. If no set can be grown while maintaining convexity, the
point is instead put into the boundary.
Theorem 3.1.7. Given n > 0, any domain S can be divided into n disjoint convex regions
plus a boundary set, which can be chosen so that the ith convex region contains a pre-
specified point xi .
Proof. Let {sα : α <| S|} be a listing of the points in the domain S, indexed by the ordinals
α. (This may be a transfinite set in the case that the domain is uncountable, for example, is
the reals; such a listing is still possible by the Axiom of Choice.) For each of the elements
xi we construct a set Ai such that xi ∈Ai and the sets are mutually disjoint.
Put E = ∅ and Ai = {xi} for each i  n. Let S0 =⋃i{Ai} ∪ E and for each α <| S|,
construct Sα+1 as follows. If sα is not already in Sα arbitrarily choose a set Ai from Sα
with the property that the convex closure of Ai ∪ {sα} does not intersect any of the other
sets Aj or E (if there is such a set Ai ). Rename the convex closure of Ai ∪ {sα} as Ai . If
there is no such Ai then add sα to E and rename E. Form Sα+1 from the union of the new
sets as before. Clearly Sα ⊆ Sα+1, each of the new sets E and Ai is convex, and all the new
sets are mutually disjoint.
It remains to perform the construction for Sα when α is a limit ordinal, that is, an infinite
union of predecessor ordinals. Put Sα =⋃{Sβ : β < α}. Define the new sets E and Ai to
be the union of the respective earlier sets. Now convexity follows using the same argument
J. Aisbett, G. Gibbon / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 189–232 203
as in the convex closure construction, and similarly for mutual disjointness since if there
were a mutual element between two sets there must be a β < α where this occurred.
In particular, this argument holds for the limit ordinal α =| S|, so it remains to show that
S|S| = S. But this follows from the fact that every element of S has been added to one of
the sets since the construction followed the enumeration {sα : α <| S|}. Finally, we observe
that the set E in S|S| is a boundary set since every element added to a previous set E was
the result of the fact that the element could not be added to a set Ai and still maintain
convexity. ✷
The ability to partition spaces into convex sets around prototypes can be assumed in the
remainder of this paper because of this important theorem.
The final result in this section concerns the centroid of a set of points or of a subspace of
an arbitrary metric space. The space cannot be assumed to be a vector space with addition
and scalar multiplication. So instead, the centroid is defined in terms of the distance
function, which takes points in the space to the reals, where addition is defined. The
definition reduces to the usual ones when the space is Euclidean. The definitions are, as
usual, with respect to compact 5 spaces, which in Euclidean spaces are the closed bounded
subsets, and in finite spaces are arbitrary subsets.
Proposition 3.1.8.
(a) Suppose v1, . . . , vn ∈ A for some compact space A with metric d , and hn(y) =∑
i=1,n wid(y, vi)2 for some positive weights wi . Then
(i) hn attains its minimum on A and
(ii) if A is a convex set in a Euclidean vector space, then hn attains its minimum
on the weighted average of the points vi .
(b) Suppose w is a non-negative weighting function on a compact space A. Then a
centroid of A can be defined which reduces to the definition (a) when A is finite, and
has the usual meaning when A is Euclidean and convex.
Proof.
(a) A minimum exists because hn =∑i=1,n wid(−, vi)2 is a continuous function from
A into the real line, and so the compact set A has closed and bounded image hn(A) in the
reals. If z is the minimum, call z the centroid of the points vi . If A is Euclidean m-space,









wi(xj − vij )2.
This attains its minimum where ∂hn(x)/∂x = 0. This is exactly when xj =∑i wivij /∑




i=1,n wi , which is the weighted




i=1,n wi is in A so the weighted
average is the centroid z.
5 A compact set A in a metric space is one in which each infinite subset has a limit point. It is closed and
bounded, that is, for any ε > 0,A is the union of a finite number of subsets of diameter ε [40].
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(b) Compactness of A means a sequence of sequences Sn = {vn,1, . . . , vn,N(n)}
can be defined such that, for arbitrary x ∈ A,miniN(n) d(x, vn,i ) < 1/n and Sn
is a shortest sequence satisfying this condition. Thus for each n,A = ⋃k>0{x ∈
A: d(vn,k, x) < 1/n}. Let zn be the centroid of the points in Sn (that is, a point minimising
hn(y)=∑i=1,N(n) w(vn,i )d(y, vn,i)2). By compactness again, the sequence of centroids{zn: n > 1} has a limit point. Define the centroid z to be a limit point.
Suppose A is Euclidean, and the sets Sn have been defined as above. As n→∞,A can
be partitioned into N(n) disjoint sets on which g and x become approximately constant,




















i=1,...,N(n) w(vn,i ) minimises
∑
i=1,...,N(n) w(vn,i )|y −





′ = limn{zn: zn minimises∑
i=1,...,N(n) w(vn,i )d(y, vn,i)2}. Thus the centroid has the usual definition. ✷
3.2. Dimensions, domains and symbols
A central notion of conceptual spaces is that of a quality dimension, used to represent
the qualities of objects and concepts. The very fact that two aspects of a representation
have been assigned to the same dimension means that they are in some sense alike. When
a conceptual space is used as a framework for scientific theory or for construction of an
artificial cognitive system, as in a robot or an automated diagnosis system, the structure
of dimensions is chosen by the scientist or system builder. The choice of dimensions
will depend heavily on the underlying theory and on what environmental sensors can
be utilised by the system—range sensors for robots or microscopic instrumentation for
analysing tissue, for example. In contrast, the dimensions of a conceptual space developed
through self structuring cannot readily be obtained from either the perceptions, or the
actions, of the animal or artificial system. They have to be inferred. The best known
psycho-experimental method for doing this is multi-dimensional scaling. This starts from
a subject’s judgements—either verbal or implied—about the similarity of pairs or sets of
stimuli as the stimuli are varied along a number of potential dimensions. The minimum
number of dimensions required to adequately explain the experimental data is calculated,
although even when this is done, the psychological interpretation of the dimensions
generated by the algorithm may not be obvious [8].
Dimensions may provide only a partial handle on the conceptual space used in cognitive
processing. The following definition captures the sometimes loose tie between the space
and its dimensional structure (discussed again later). This tie is achieved by associating the
space to a dimension only through a projective mapping, which must, however, preserve
betweenness, as this is the primary ingredient of geometry in our spaces. Notions of
complete and covered dimension sets are introduced as nomenclature for cases in which
the conceptual space is fully described by the dimensions.
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A serious problem with describing an object as “a point in conceptual space” is that,
often, dimensions in the space are irrelevant or inappropriate to a particular object or
concept. Furthermore, an object’s values on relevant dimensions may be unknown to the
system. As indicated above, the distinguished element ∗ has been introduced as a technical
device to allow for these cases.
Definition 3.2.1 (Dimensions, completeness and coverings).
(a) A dimension of a space D equipped with a betweenness relation B is a space Di
equipped with
(i) a metric di ;
(ii) a betweenness relation Bi ;
(iii) a continuous projection: πiD→Di such that πi preserves betweenness, i.e.,
given a, b, c ∈D such that B(a, b, c) and the elements map to distinct elements
in Di − {∗}, then Bi(πi(a),πi(b),πi(c)).
(b) A set of dimensions {Di, i = 1, . . . ,N} is complete for D if, for any x, y ∈D with
πi(x) = πi(y) for every i  N , then x = y . Thus for example, the Red and Green
colour dimensions, without Blue, are not a complete set of dimensions for colour
space.
(c) A set of dimensions {Di, i = 1, . . . ,N} is covered by D if for every mem-
ber p of D1 × D2 × · · · × DN there is an element x ∈ D such that p =
{π1(x),π2(x), . . . , πN(x)}. The NCS colour spindle [19] is an example of a product
of dimensions which is not covered: there are points on one colour axis which are
projected upon only when the other projections fall in a certain range.
If a set of covered dimensions {Di, i = 1, . . . ,N} is complete for D, any element in D
can be represented as a unique N -tuple {y1, y2, y3, . . . , yN }.
Gärdenfors [15] identifies conceptual spaces with spaces generated by a set of dimen-
sions. Our more general definition allows the possibility of learning through discovering
more structure. In the physical environment there are relationships—sometimes subtle and
sometimes perceptually evident—between qualities. An example of a subtle relationship
is the mass, volume and pressure of a gas, of a perceptually evident one is the hue, satu-
ration and intensity of colour. In human conceptualisation there are therefore dimensions
which are inextricably related, in the sense that one cannot assign an object a value on one
dimension without giving it a value on another. These dimensions are called integral in the
cognition literature, and include the pitch and volume of sound. Dimensions which are not
integral are said to be separable.
Children learn to separate dimensions as part of their development, the classic example
being confusion amongst volume and spatial dimensions. More generally, training and
experience allow people to separate dimensions in stimuli they initially find integral. In
animal and human conceptualisation, separability of dimensions is defined through the
form of the distance metric that appears to be used in judgements involving multiple
dimensions: if a city block metric is not fitted by experimental data on conceptual distances
involving multiple dimensions, then the dimensions are assumed to involve at least one pair
of integral dimensions (e.g., [39]). The metric structure of psychological space has been
the subject of extensive experimental study [27].
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Despite difficulties in interpreting experimental results, formally distinguishing integral
and separable dimensions is straightforward. Part (a) of the following definition merely
groups those dimensions which are integral into what will be called domains. Part (b)
allows that not all points in the product of a set of integral dimensions may be conceptually
feasible, as is the case with colour as a three dimensional domain. After this definition,
we tend to talk in terms of domains, as the molecular units which provide the stuff of
concepts, but which are themselves composed of dimensions at the atomic level. Mostly,
we won’t look into how the domains are structured—how the atoms are bound—and so
the maps φi in this definition are rarely referred to in later definitions. However, they are
an important part of the conceptual structure, and, as the psychological literature indicates,
affect similarity judgements.
Definition 3.2.2 (Integral and separable dimensions, and domains).
(a) Consider a space D with dimensions Di, i = 1,2,3 . . . . Suppose that for some M
less than or equal to the number of dimensions, the set {1,2, . . . ,M} is partitioned
by M ′ non-singleton subsets Yi (i.e., each Yi has more than one element, and
Yi ∩ Yj = ∅ for each i = j , and ⋃{Yi}i=1,...,M ′ = {1,2, . . . ,M}). For i > M ′, set
Yi to be the singleton set containing the integer M −M ′ + i .
Then call a dimension integral if it indexed by Yi for i  M ′, and say that any
dimensions indexed by the same set Yi are integrally related.
Any two dimensions which are not integrally related are called separable.
(b) For i >M ′, let ∆i =Di+M−M ′ .
For i  M ′, let ∆i be isomorphic to π(D), where π :D → ∏j {Dj : j ∈ Yi} is
induced by the projections πi :D→Di and there is a set function φi :∏j {Dj : j ∈
Yi}→∆i which is an isomorphism of metric spaces on π(D), and is φi(x)= ∗ for
x /∈ π(D). 6
Abuse notation by letting πi :D → ∆i be the composite φiπi . Similarly abuse
notation by denoting the induced metric on ∆i by di and the induced betweenness
relation by Bi .
The spaces ∆i are called the domains of D determined by the dimension partition {Yi}
and are called integral domains if they are formed from more than one dimension. The map
πi is called the projection onto the ith domain.
A set of domains can be complete for and/or covered by D in analogous definitions to
3.2.1. A product of domains, each with a distance measure, is equipped with a distance
measure through the city block metric. 7 This is a consequence of the definition of
domains: the dimensions in different domains are independent. So distances should be
6 Here and elsewhere, if Ai is a space with a distinguished point ∗, a product A1 × A2 × · · · × An ≡∏
i=1,...,n Ai is understood to mean the set {(a1, a2, . . . , an): ai ∈ Ai } with distinguished point (∗,∗, . . . ,∗).
The product takes the city block metric (footnote 7) except on points such as (∗,1,1, . . .), for which the behaviour
of the metric is discussed in Section 4. Given a set of maps βi :B→Ai ,
∏
i=1,...,n βi :B →
∏
i=1,...,n Ai is the
map defined componentwise.
7 The city block metric d on a product of metric spaces A1 × · · · ×An with respective metrics di is given by
d(x,y)=∑i di (xi , yi ), for x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn). In general, a Minkowski metric is defined as
(
∑
i di (xi , yi )
r )1/r , which if r = 2 is called a Euclidean metric and if r =∞ is called a chess board metric.
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additive across domains. In contrast, even though Definition 3.2.2(b) makes a domain ∆i
isomorphic to a space equipped with a city block metric composed from distances in the
dimensions of ∆i,∆i itself might have the Euclidean or some other distance.
The final definition of this section distinguishes a set of dimensions, the symbol
subspace. As discussed earlier, developing the links that perceptual and symbolic systems
have with a conceptual system is a key contribution of this paper, and the symbolic
communication is through this subspace.
A modelling or construction device used in almost all cognitive systems is to link the
strength of activity on a symbolic dimension with the pattern of activity in subsymbolic
dimensions (e.g., in fuzzy pattern recognition systems, ART networks etc.). In the next
sections, we formally explore in conceptual space terminology what happens in systems
such as ART or PATON [29] which allow the external activation of a symbol dimension to
change the current value on non-symbol dimensions and vice versa. Therefore the explicit
link to magnitude in the following definition of a symbol dimension formalises what is
routinely assumed by modellers of cognitive representations.
Definition 3.2.3 (Symbol subspace). A symbol subspace of size n is a space generated
by n dimensions which are each isometric 8 to {∗} ∪ (0,1]). A dimension in the symbol
subspace is called a symbol dimension.
If the distinguished point ∗ is called 0 then, as sets, a symbol dimension can be identified
with [0,1].
4. Conceptual spaces and their key constructs
This section presents a generic formulation of conceptual spaces which attempts to
constrain the representation as little as possible, while capturing the essential features of
conceptual spaces teased out in [15]. These are the notion of dimensions and domains,
of properties as regions in domains, and of concepts defined via properties. Selective
associations between such regions and symbols are the basis of representation and
communication.
The first section presents a specification of conceptual spaces, setting out the conditions
for a set to qualify as a conceptual space. The dimensions are the “handles” used to describe
the base conceptual space. The key constructs of objects, properties and concepts, together
with generalised distance functions, are then defined formally. These give conceptual
spaces the power of geometric representation. The final section describes an individual’s
conceptualisation as a subspace of conceptual space, in which symbols are linked to
regions and to prototypical values in concept space. This allows properties to be described
in terms of how an individual conceives that a domain is associated with a symbol. The
richer structure necessary for reasoning is dynamically derived from these associations, as
shown in Section 5.
8 An isometry between spaces A and A′ with distance metrics d and d ′ respectively is an isomorphism ϕ such
that d(x, y)= d ′(ϕ(x),ϕ(y)) for all x,y ∈A.
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4.1. Conceptual space definition
We are almost in a position to specify a conceptual space: We have a way to say that
things are not applicable or not known; we have a way of identifying concepts, properties
and objects, as regions or points, and of naming them through symbols—so we can label
concepts as dog or chair etc.—; we have a way of representing how applicable each such
symbol is to a conceptual state through the activity on the symbol dimension; and we have
a way of allowing for domains like colour which are not simply products of dimensions.
One remaining complication is the composition of concepts, such as “a woman in a
yellow dress in a yellow Volkswagen” and “pale blood cells and pallid patient”. These
involve shared concepts, such as “yellow” in the first example or “pale” in the second,
which need to be bound to the correct object or concept. The binding problem is a recurring
representational theme, for which the mechanisms used in the brain are still not known
(e.g., [30]). Activation related to a single concept may, however, be identified by carrier
frequency or phase in a multiplexed signal [12]. We employ an equivalent solution for
the binding problem, viz. multiple copies of a base conceptual space are made, with the
distinguished point indicating when a copy is not involved in a complex concept. 9
A final complication is that the representation arguably ought to include any construc-
tions used to support the dynamics in conceptual space, just as human working memory is
part of memory. The key construction is the “spotlighting” of regions in conceptual space
relevant to the current problem-solving task. These regions are specified in a buffer, whose
length is included as a parameter in the following definition of the conceptual space. The
form and use of the buffer is described fully in Section 5.
Definition 4.1.1 (Conceptual space). A conceptual space is defined by the specification of
• A space C, called the base conceptual space, with distance metric d , and a
betweenness relation B .
• A decomposition of C as the product C =DL×D such that d is the city block metric
formed from the metrics on DL and D. D is called the concept space. DL is called
the symbol space and is isometric to a product of closed unit intervals [0,1]l for some
l > 0, as described in 3.2.3.
• A finite index set Dim together with a partition {Yi}i∈Dom of Dim into subsets indexed
by Dom = Dom(int) ∪ Dom(sep), in which i ∈ Dom(sep) if and only if Yi has only
one element.
• The association of each i ∈Dim with a space Di called a dimension of D, defined as
in 3.2.1(a), and the association of each i ∈ Dom with a space ∆i called a domain of
D, defined as in 3.2.2.
• An integer v > 0 which is the number of copies of C in the conceptual space; these
copies are referred to as levels in conceptual space. The product Cv is equipped with
a distance measure using the city block metric.
• A set (C[C])s called the attention buffer, where s > 0 and C[A] denotes the set of all
connected subsets of A.
9 Chella et al. [9] take points in conceptual space to be a sequence of superquadric surfaces, and complex
objects to be sets of such points with a symbolic layer describing various types of motion.
J. Aisbett, G. Gibbon / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 189–232 209
Fig. 4. Illustration of defining structures in conceptual space. The conceptual space has levels, each structured as
the base conceptual space C which, in this example, is supposed to be a metric space of piecewise continuous
functions into [0,1] ∪ {∗}. The base space is the product of a symbol space DL and a concept space D, which
project under maps πi onto dimension spaces, in this example, by restriction onto closed intervals in [E,F ].
Symbol space is isometric to a product of intervals (0,1], each with distinguished point {0}. Products of some
dimensions map onto integral domains ∆k . In this example, domains are formed whenever the intervals which
define dimensions overlap, and points in a domain space are the union of functions defined on such dimensions
which agree on the overlap. See text.
Recall that spaces and maps are defined in the category of metric spaces with distin-
guished points, so that all maps in this definition are continuous and take distinguished
points to distinguished points.
Fig 4. illustrates the main aspects of the definition, using a family of waveforms to
represent conceptual space. Specifically, conceptual space is a family of functions defined
on a finite interval [E,F ], taking values in [0,1] ∪ {∗}. A dimension is the restriction of
the family to a closed subinterval of [E,F ]. Multi-dimensional domains are formed when
intervals defining dimensions overlap. Symbol dimensions are defined on a subinterval,
[E,Fs] say. Functions in the family are constants in [0,1] on symbol dimensions. They
are continuous in concept space except when taking the value ∗. The distance between two
functions f and g is the average absolute difference of functions over the relevant interval
I , that is, |I |−1 ∫I |f (x)−g(x)|dx . Betweenness is derived from betweenness of the values
of functions, that is B(f,g,h) if and only for all x ∈ I either (a) f (x) < g(x) < h(x) or
f (x)= ∗= g(x)= h(x) or (b) f (x) > g(x) > h(x) or f (x)= ∗= g(x)= h(x).
Another example of a conceptual space is a 2-layer network, in which case nodes are
dimensions, relative magnitude of activation at a node gives distance in that dimension, the
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upper level nodes form symbol space, and associations between nodes at the lower level
lead to non-trivial domains.
A final example of conceptual spaces as defined by 4.1.1 is a set of Euclidean spaces, in
which each component takes values in the reals, the integers or a finite ordered set, each
with infinity adjoined. Betweenness has the conventional definition. Such spaces subsume
many of the feature spaces used in practical and theoretical work on classification. Note,
however, that our definition explicitly recognises the need to name classes and feature
dimensions in the symbol space DL.
Just as the language of a logic or the structure of a network constrains what can be
done, the conceptual space specification constrains the possible conceptual richness of
representation. The ability to represent the environment can grow through a variety of
mechanisms which reflect human development. Specifically, aspects of the development of
an individual’s ability to conceptualise, as opposed to development of what they know or
believe, can be modelled within the framework of Definition 4.1.1, through:
(i) Enlarging the base conceptual space to incorporate experience; for example,
enlarging the family of functions in Fig. 4.
(ii) Learning new dimensions, and the way to project onto them; for example, forming
a dimension from the restriction of functions to the interval [F4,F5] in Fig. 4.
(iii) Acquiring new names (increasing the dimensionality of symbol space); for
example, splitting a symbol dimension in Fig. 4.
(iv) Unravelling dimensions in domains (moving dimensions from the set of integral
domains to the set of separable domains), or vice versa; for example, learning
domain ∆2 in Fig. 4 to be separable dimensions of restrictions of functions to
[F0,F1], [F1,F2], [F2,F3].
(v) Being able to formulate more complex concepts by increasing the number of levels
of composition (that is, the parameter v in 4.1.1); or
(vi) Increasing the ability to focus on areas (by increasing the parameter s in 4.1.1).
The definition of conceptual space can be enhanced to increase the degree to which the
space is constrained by its dimensions. For example, a completely dimensioned conceptual
space could be defined as one in which the dimensions are complete. As well, the spaces
and maps in the definition could be specified as belonging to a category within the category
of pointed metric spaces, eg. pointed Euclidean spaces. The distance metrics could also be
constrained.
4.2. Objects, properties and concepts
We can now describe the key constructs of objects, properties, and concepts. Properties
are the building block of representations. Many variants are required to capture the
subtleties exhibited in different knowledge domains. We take as a basic property what
Gärdenfors [15] terms a natural property, one that is defined on a convex region. Because
of Theorem 3.1.7, we know that any domain can be partitioned or tessellated into a
set of convex regions and a boundary set. The following definition also allows graded
membership of points in the regions which define properties, so that for example some
“black” colours can be “less black” than others; these gradings might be applied to
members of the boundary sets in a tessellation of the domain. There are many other useful
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definitions that might be applied to subcategorise properties and concepts. For example,
fuzziness could be defined, as could action properties which have temporal duration, to
capture properties like “fast heart rate”.
Definition 4.2.1.
(a) A simple object is defined to be a point in base conceptual space C. A complex
object is a finite union of simple objects, that is, a set of points at different levels in
the conceptual space.
(b) A (natural) property is defined to be a convex region in a domain, and a complex
property is a finite union of natural properties.
• A property P on domain ∆ is graded if there is a grading function g :∆→[0,1]
such that g(x) > 0 if and only if x ∈ P and B(a, x, b) & a, b ∈ P ⇒ g(x) 
min(g(a), g(b)).
(c) A concept c(P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) involving complex or natural properties Pi with
domain ∆j(i) is a region in D such that for arbitrary x ∈ c(P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) and for
each i  n,πj (i)(x) ∈ Pi and for each domain k /∈ {j (1), . . . , j (n)},πk(x)= ∗. So





(Pi), the intersection in D of the inverse
images of the properties defining the concept.
Note that concepts are therefore regions in conceptual space, whereas properties are
regions in domains. 10 Thus in general, a property is not a concept. In the example of Fig. 4
a concept might involve a subset of functions defined over the entire interval between and
including D4 and D5, which is more complex than the union of functions projecting onto
those dimensions. The reason for representing concepts this way is to allow them to be
more than the dimensions that are used to describe them. Thus the concept of “dingo” may
be more to an individual who fears or loves the animals than the properties that they can
list, whereas to someone who does not know what a dingo is, a listing of the properties may
equate to their concept “dingo”. The clinician can list the patient’s self reported condition,
their own reading of the signs, and the laboratory reports, and still have not captured the
conceptualisation on which they will make a diagnosis.
Note, also, that under our definition, a concept maps into the product of sets of properties
in a product of domains∆1×∆2×· · ·×∆n, but that not all points in a product of properties
may be in the concept. That is, the concept does not necessarily cover the product of its
properties. Thus in the depiction in Fig. 2, if the projection of the concept medium is
onto intervals medium weight and medium height the concept does not cover points of
the product medium weight x medium height which are at the high end of medium weight
and the low end of medium height.
Not all qualities are equally important in defining a concept. Thus red blood cell volume
is the defining and hence most important quality, for the concept “anaemia”, drawing on
scientifically measured rather than perceptual domains. The importance of a domain to a
concept may be inversely related to the relative size of properties, since if a domain is less
important, then values in it may be relatively arbitrary. In any case, the need to establish the
relevance of qualities or attributes to categorisation tasks is well understood. The following
10 If a space is complete and covered then properties can be treated as concepts, as assumed in [15].
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definition provides for a way of recording the relative importance of domains to symbols.
Symbols are dependably associated with internal states of the conceptual system, so that a
symbol can be viewed as labelling a concept, whether abstract or naming something in the
environment. The importance functionw summarises the associations which the individual
makes between concepts and properties, and plays an instrumental role in the dynamics of
conceptual spaces in Section 5.
Definition 4.2.2. Importance is a function w : {1,2, . . . , l} × {1,2, . . . ,Dom} → [0,1]
where w(k, j) is said to be the importance of the domain ∆j to the concept c named
by the kth symbol. If the kth symbol names the concept c(P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) where Pi is in
domain ∆j(i), then w(k, j (i)) is also said to be the importance or salience of the property
Pi to the concept.
4.3. Distances and similarity
Notions of similarity and distance have to be developed for objects, properties and
concepts, and must take into account context. People are notoriously willing to judge
the similarity of a pair of objects or concepts, but they are easily induced to vary
this assessment between experiments. This is because similarity, and hence distance,
depends on the context in which the assessment is made. The importance of context
is well recognised in research concerning representations, with the favoured modelling
mechanism being selective weighting of factors used to assess similarity. Context can be
accounted in the choice of domains, ie. with a binary weighting. The following definition
uses the Hausdorff distance introduced in Section 3 to define distances between concepts
and between properties, since these are regions rather than points.
Definition 4.3.1 (Contexts, distances between objects).
(a) A context is a set of domains. An object a is defined in a context if πi(a) = ∗ for
each domain ∆i in the context. A concept c(P1, . . . ,Pn) is defined in a context if
the context includes the domains of each of the properties Pi .
(b) The distance dC(a, b) between two simple objects a and b which are defined in a
context C = {∆j(i), i = 1, . . . ,K} is ∑iK dj(i)(πj (i)(a),πj (i)(b)).
The distance dHC (A,B) between two regions A and B in the context C is the














In particular, the distance between two properties or concepts can be defined using
this function.
Defining the distance between simple objects or concepts independent of context, or
when one or both objects/concepts are not defined in the nominated context, involves
dealing with values ∗, denoting “not applicable” data. Thus, the clinician may try to
compare a patient’s symptoms and signs with those of a case study anaemic they learned
at medical school. But their patient does not have fatigue and is complaining about
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backache which was not in the stereotypical profile. How should mismatch of conditions
be dealt with? One approach is to simply ignore unmatched domains—though to ignore
the backache could be irresponsible of the clinician. An even more drastic approach is to
set the distance to infinity ie. treat the objects as incomparable. However, throwing out
the possibility of anaemia because of reported backache is not a recommended diagnostic
approach. More flexibly, a finite penalty on unmatched domains might apply, as in [1]. For
example, cost might be proportional to the number of domains on which one object, but not
both, is defined. The importance function w could be employed to support a more realistic
costing.
Distance between complex objects is complicated not only by the possibility of values ∗,
but also by the fact that the most appropriate match may involve a permutation of the levels
(that is, the versions) of the base conceptual space. For example, object O may consist of
a yellow Volkswagen in level 1, pulling a boat represented in level 2 on a trailer in level 3.
ObjectO ′ may consist of the boat in level 1, and the trailer in level 2. Defining the distance
between two such objects O and O ′ involves finding the best fit between the subobjects
on which they are both defined, taking into account the cost of leaving parts of the objects
unmatched. 11
It is evident that even when distances in domains are well understood, it may be difficult
to relate them to the judgements that a conceptual system makes about distance between
concepts in a given context.
As we have said, the natural definition of similarity of objects in terms of distances in
conceptual space is one of the main advantages of the conceptual space representation.
Like distance, similarity is a real valued non-negative bivariate function, call it s. The
relationship between similarity and distance is largely one of definition, and the terms are
used informally as reciprocal notions in many disciplinary areas. A commonly-assumed
relationship is s(a, b) = (1 + d(a, b))−1. While the nature of similarity is still debated
in the cognitive literature (e.g., [17]), similarity is usually represented there as a negative
exponential function of distance, and usually with an exponent of 1 or 2 (e.g., [38]). This
functional form has been derived from experimental data in which distances d are relative
scientific magnitudes rather than phenomenal distances. But there is still much to be done
to understand the relationship between similarity and conceptual distance. For example,
it may be desirable to judge things as having zero similarity even when they are only
separated by a finite distance, for example, in assessing finger nail distortion against an
exemplar. Nevertheless, reasonable postulates relating distance and similarity are:
(1) similarity should be a maximum (at 1) when distance is zero,
(2) similarity should be monotonically decreasing with distance,
(3) similarity with ∗ should be zero for all points other than ∗.
The similarity of objects a and b might therefore be defined in the context C to be
exp(−u · dC(a, b)) where u is a sensitivity parameter. The distance between two objects
would then be a multiple of the negative log of their similarity. The similarity of two
concepts c1 and c2 defined in the context C would be exp(−u · dHC (c1, c2)).
11 There will be unmatched parts whenever one of the objects has more components (occupies more levels) than
the other, or when the objects take values ∗ in different domains.
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4.4. An individual’s conceptual space, associations, prototypes and categories
Definition 4.1.1 of base conceptual space as a product of a symbol space and a concept
space associates each concept state with every possible symbol. Specifying the conceptual
space to be the whole of DL×D is analogous to specifying the language of a logic, or the
structure of a neural network without the weights—it provides an infrastructure only. This
infrastructure has to be refined through more precise linkage of non-symbol elements to
symbols, just as a theory of logic might capture an individual’s beliefs
Ideally, each point x in D (other than ∗) would be associated to just one point in DL,
namely the vector which specifies the applicability, in the range 0 to 1, of each of the
symbol dimensions to x , or equivalently, specifies how representative the concept x is to
the symbol vector. For example, “palpitations”, “pallor” and “spoon shaped nails” might
be assessed as being very typical of a patient with iron deficiency anaemia but less typical
of leukaemia, and this would be reflected in the associations between the points associated
with these qualities in D and the symbol dimensions for “iron deficiency anaemia” and
“leukaemia”. At worst, a point in D might be associated with a range within [0,1] for each
symbol dimension, to allow for imprecision in the notion of applicability. Most symbol
dimensions will be inapplicable to any object and so take the value zero (that is, the ∗
value on these dimensions).
We define an individual’s conceptual space A(C) to be the subspace of DL ×D which
only contains pairs (s, x) of symbol dimension vectors s and points x in D in which
s reflects beliefs about the appropriateness of the symbols to the points. This subspace
describes how each symbol is associated with the region (including singletons) to which it
refers. The associations will vary according to the individual, and will vary as the individual
learns. For communication, as we have said, associations that different individuals make
must have enough commonality to support some shared understanding of the referents
of the symbols exchanged. Thus the form of the association cannot change too fast. As
learning is not the focus of this paper, we assume that the associations are fixed (at least,
on the time scale of the dynamics considered later).
Properties can now be described in terms of the individual’s conceptual space. Suppose a
symbol indexed by k ∈ {1,2, . . . , l} names a concept c(Pk,r(1), . . . ,Pk,r(q)), where Pk,r(j)
is a property in domain ∆r(j). Then Pk,r(j) is the region in this domain associated with
this named thing by the individual. 12 Thus, it is reasonable to propose that Pkr(j) =
{πr(j)(y): y ∈ A(C); πk(y) = 1}. For example, suppose that the kth symbol dimension
represents the concept “anaemic patient”. Then associated properties Pk,j might be the
region in the colour domain, within the subdomain of complexion colours, considered
pale; or the region in the fatigue domain which represents lassitude. These properties
might be the projection of all the points in the individual’s conceptual space in which
the label “anaemic patient” was fully applicable, and so would include the projections
of any remembered cases of patients classified as anaemic. Of course, a patient can be
anaemic without being pale, or indeed without exhibiting any symptoms or signs, if they
have decreased red cell volume but have physiologically compensated for it. However,
12 Here and elsewhere, if Pk,j is defined, it is assumed to be non-empty.
J. Aisbett, G. Gibbon / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 189–232 215
Fig. 5. Notation for prototypes. f (k, j) denotes the prototypical value in the domain ∆j for the concept labeled
with the kth symbol, viz. the centroid of the region Pk,j in the domain associated by the individual with
the concept. In this example, points in conceptual space are the family of functions described in Figure 4.
Any two functions define a region, namely the set of functions which lie between them, where B(f,g,h) if
and only for all x either (a) f (x) < g(x) < h(x) or f (x) = ∗ = g(x) = h(x) or (b) f (x) > g(x) > h(x) or
f (x)= ∗= g(x)= h(x).
normal conditions will not be explicitly associated with anaemia in any reasonable
conceptualisation.
Define the prototypical value f (k, j) in the domain ∆j of the concept labelled
with the kth symbol dimension to be the centroid 13 of Pk,j , computed as in 3.1.8(b).
A characteristic such as convexity is needed to ensure that the centroid is actually in the
region, although it could plausibly be argued there is no reason that the prototype should
be a member of the region, only that it be the best representative of the members of the
region. To illustrate the notion, Fig. 5 depicts prototypes in the example setting used in
Fig. 4, in which points in conceptual space are piecewise continuous functions.
Clearly the same prototypical value f (k, j) can represent many different regions. In
the limit, it represents the point set which is its own value, which could occur when a
concept has been learned through explicit tuition, rather than having been experienced.
Thus to a novice an anaemic patient may be associated with a prototypical value for tongue
texture corresponding to a medical web site picture. The use of prototypes is critical to the
manipulation of conceptual spaces, as will be evident when we deal with dynamics in
Section 5.
Given a set of symbol indices K , the weighted average of the associated prototypical
property values f (k, j) for k ∈K can in turn be defined as a centroid using 3.1.8(a). If the
weight on f (k, j) is w(k, j), denote such a centroid by 〈w(k, j)f (k, j): k ∈K〉.
While prototypes can be defined as centroids of regions, they can also define regions,
because of the tessellation Theorem 3.1.7 which partitioned a space into n disjoint convex
13 This assumes Pk,j is compact; if not, the prototype can be defined as the centroid of a compact subset of
Pk,j , or of the compact closure if this exists.
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spaces around a set of prototypes p1,p2, . . . , p. Thus a set of patients can be divided into
normal and anaemic, and the latter subdivided into those with iron-deficiency anaemia and
those with chronic disease anaemia, and so on. Case studies might provide the prototypical
examples of the diseases.
Alternatively, the prototypes used in defining properties Pk,j as convex regions might
be the centroid of a finite set of exemplars, that is, as the prototype of a category whose
members instantiate the concept labelled by k. A category is a collection of objects or
things sharing some conceptual likeness. Gärdenfors defines a category to be a set of ob-
jects instantiating a defining set of properties {P1,P2, . . . ,Pk}; however, categories may
be formed on the basis of theories, similarity to exemplars, or distance from prototypes. 14
We suggest that, given disjoint categories of objects classified by theories, perhaps, or via
scientific measurements, then exemplars of each category might be used to form proto-
types, computed as the centroids 3.1.8(a). (Such a process might involve scientific studies
establishing the symptoms and signs of a disease, and exposure to cases teaching the clin-
ician to recognise these symptoms and signs as indicators of the disease.) The prototypes
of categories of exemplars in turn could be used to determine properties of the category,
using Theorem 3.1.7. While it is desirable that the prototype of a property coincide with
the centroid of the region defining the property, even in Euclidean domains tessellation
creates regions in which the centroid computed using Voronoi tessellation can be distant
from the prototype calculated from the exemplars. So forming a property Pk,j in this way
means f (k, j) may not be the centroid of the exemplars of the concept labelled by k.
5. Dynamics of conceptual spaces
5.1. Introduction
This section applies conceptual spaces to two key aspects of problem solving, namely
differentiation and composition, and shows how structures can be derived through
dynamics.
We have said that representations may be thought of as states which support a system’s
purposeful interaction with its environment. Conceptual spaces must be equipped with
an algorithm which allows the state of the system to change in response to input or to
internal computation, in analogy with connectionist and symbolic systems. Each point in a
conceptual space is a potential conceptual state: being “what you’re thinking about” if the
point is inside active areas of attention, and being “what you know” if it is outside active
areas of attention. Problem solving is a progression of thoughts which are, sometimes
at least, related in the systematic fashion that we call reasoning. To support problem
solving, a mechanism is needed to move from one conceptual state to another in response
to external information or internal reasoning strategies. Problem solving highlights the
need for multiple levels of representation to depict complex objects, because several
conceptually-distinct objects may need to be manipulated at the same time.
14 The role of prototypes, or even similarity to exemplars, in categorisation remain disputed [36]. There are many
reasons for defining a category as a problem solving or information-ordering device, and thus many mechanisms
are used to categorise things (see, for example, [25]).
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Introducing dynamics into the formalism requires a time parameter. At any time t , an
individual’s conceptual state is described by a point in conceptual space. The dynamics
describe the movement of this function in conceptual space over time. We adopt a discrete
time perspective, as one physiologically as well as computationally motivated by system
reaction times. The time interval between temporally adjacent states is taken to be one unit.
The dynamics can be phrased generally as state transitions or as rules. In either case,
state changes are effected through the associations between substates in the symbol and
concept spaces. The transition rules or difference equations which govern state changes
are phrased in terms of regions and distances, and so are embedded in the geometry of
conceptual spaces. The active areas in each subsystem are determined by a mask which
leaves open what we call the area of attention.
Management of attention is crucial to problem solving. Two assumptions about human
attention are “nearly axiomatic” in cognitive psychology, according to Barsalou [3],
namely, information is isolated by being focused upon in perception, then, to a “very high
likelihood”, it is stored in long-term memory. He says “From decades of work on attention,
we know that people have a sophisticated and flexible ability to focus attention on features
. . . , as well as on the relations between features”. The mechanisms by which attention is
controlled are not clear, although areas of attention change rapidly. Control of attention
is also an important research area in robotics and computer vision. In ART-like networks,
attention is modelled using a gain control which partially controls interactions between the
upper (symbolic) and the lower concept (pattern) layers (e.g., [5–7,29]).
Our system uses an attention buffer, that is, a sequence of attention areas which are
stepped through as the state in each area of attention stabilises. The buffer is filled by an
algorithm which takes as input the current state of the symbol subspace. Multiple symbols
active on the one level result in composition of concepts, and symbol activity at multiple
levels results in the selection of one of the levels. These two modes of operation, combine
and select, are evident in a wide range of processing systems. Neural networks, whether
artificial or biological, exhibit inhibitory or reinforcing modes of activation dependent
on whether concepts combine or compete. Paredis [31] has argued that problem solving
is the interaction of selection and combination processes at a micro level. In his work,
these processes originate from the application of simple rules to pairs of elementary
solution constituents. In yet another setting, Humphreys et al. [22] define “Choose” and
“Intersection” primitives for human memory access systems to perform these functions.
The symbol space exchanges information with the external world, and plays a key role
in initiating sequences of state changes. It is not, however, necessary to suppose some
higher level authority is in control or interpreting the results of state changes. Rather,
concept states may change in response to the symbol state, and symbol states may change
in response to the concept state, in an endless, aimless processing loop.
In this section, the form of state transitions is explored and the algorithm for setting
attention is presented, along with control principles. The formation of composite concepts
using the dynamics is then described. The final section illustrates the dynamics on a typical
example of categorisation, which, as we have said, is the key problem-solving activity at
the conceptual level. The example draws out the inherent relationship between geometry in
the space and the trajectory of conceptual states during problem solving. Section 6 presents
specific examples of conceptual spaces and their dynamics.
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The following terminology and notation will be used:
Definition 5.1.1.
(a) An individual’s conceptual state at time t is denoted c(t). That is, c(t) ∈A(C).
(b) If k indexes a symbol dimension, c(k, t) denotes the projection onto the kth
dimension [0,1] of DL of c(t) and is called the activity level of the kth symbol
dimension. We also say that symbol k is active at a point x ∈ C if c(k, t) is greater
than some minimum value. 15
(c) ci(t) denotes the projection of c(t) onto the ith concept domain, viz ci(t)= πi(c(t)).
The notation differs from that for symbol space to make it obvious whether
projections are onto symbol or concept spaces.
(d) Given an element x in a concept domain ∆s , let π−1s (x) denote {y: πs(y) =
x,πr(y)= ∗ for r = s}. This can be defined, because concept domains are separable
and C is the product of concept and symbol space. We refer to π−1s (−) as “the state
over domain s”.
5.2. Dynamics
Dynamics in conceptual spaces are based on five key notions:
(a) The current conceptual state is represented as a point in conceptual space Cv which
follows a non-deterministic trajectory as a result of external input (see (d)), and
internally-derived activity (see (c)).
(b) For most problems, only a relatively few concepts are relevant, and problem solving
needs to focus on these. A time-varying buffer is used to carry a prioritised list of
windows or areas of attention, which are regions in base conceptual space. The head
of the buffer specifies the current area of attention, which will not necessarily change
between time periods.
(c) Changes in the current state in conceptual space occur only in attention areas.
Changes can be seen as transitions of a recurrent network or dynamical system
controlled by the attention buffer. Alternatively, they can be seen to be consequences
of rules activated when their preconditions are a “close enough” match to the current
area of attention and/or the current state in the current area of attention. (This is
analogous to a database update in which the area to be updated is identified through
the buffer.)
(d) The conceptual state receives external inputs primarily through the symbol dimen-
sions, and produces output through these dimensions. This can be viewed as part of
a two-way symbolic communication, possibly with “higher” systems although also
possibly with peer level systems. There can also be communication with a subcon-
ceptual systems which might alter the concept state. Recall Fig. 1.
(e) When an attention buffer is emptied while a symbol or set of symbols L is still
active, an operation SetAttention(L) sets the initial state and refills the buffer with
the areas of attention which are most salient in L (in a sense discussed below). If no
15 The minimum value may be globally set. It may be zero.
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Fig. 6. Dynamics in conceptual space. Four epochs are shown. Regions of change are dictated by an attention
buffer, depicted schematically here as a dark bar indicating the relevant domains in D. Transitions of type 1 set
states in areas which had projected onto ∗ , as in the transition c(t)→ c(t+1). Transitions of type 2 change values
in symbol dimensions, as in the transition c(t + 1)→ c(t + 2). Reset refills the attention buffer and sets current
state to have existing values in symbol space, and undefined values in concept space, e.g., c(t + 2)→ c(t + 3).
symbols are active, a repair or training situation is entered. The management of the
area of attention through this operation is central to problem solving.
There are two fundamental types of transitions—symbol activity triggering concept state
transitions, and vice versa—and control devices including the setting of the attention buffer.
These are described below. These operations are sufficient to perform categorisation, as is
shown in the next section. Fig. 6 illustrates typical results of actions of the operations,
using the example of a conceptual space as a space of piecewise continuous functions. An
example of how forms of transitions can equip the space with particular problem solving
strategies is provided in Section 6.
Two important points: Firstly, the attention buffer is always phrased in terms of the
base conceptual space, and the region specified in Att(0) is the region of attention for all
levels. Transitions occur within a level, so unhelpful complexity is avoided in the following
exposition by treating c(t) to be scalar rather than vector.
Secondly, changes to the current state c(t)→ c(t + 1) are specified through changes
to values in domains, and domain values do not change unless specified. This is possible
because of our assumption that conceptual space covers the product of domains and symbol
dimensions. Except in the special case in which the concept space D is also complete
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(i.e., is a product of the domains), specifying what happens on projections to domains does
not fully determine the transition from state c(t) to state c(t + 1). That is, the transition in
the period [t, t + 1) may have a non-deterministic element within conceptual space; only
the projections onto the domains are fully determined.
5.2.1. Transitions
The first fundamental type of state transition, call it type 1, changes the state in concept
space, i.e., changes some values ci(t). Type 1 transitions set the current state in the area of
attention, provided that the current state is not already defined there (that is, provided
ci(t) = ∗) and provided there are active symbols associated with this area. A type 1
transition therefore initialises part of the concept state space. The second transition type
changes the state in symbol space, i.e., changes some values c(k, t). Type 2 transitions feed
back activity to the symbol dimensions associated with active regions in conceptual space
D if these regions are also in the area of attention.
Rich use of geometry may be involved in defining the scope of transitions or their effect.
For example, a type 1 transition might depend not only on which symbol dimensions
are currently active, but also on whether the prototypical value (centroid) f (k, i) for the
concept associated with the kth symbol on domain ∆i is in the area of attention. Then
the state change may depend on another calculation of a centroid, using the combined
weights of the importance w of the domain to the concept, and the activity of the symbol
labelling the concept. A type 1 transition might therefore have the following equation,
which initialises the state on a domain∆i to be the centroid of the set of prototypical values
(in this domain) of active symbols, provided these values are in the region of attention:
ci(t + 1)=
〈
c(k, t)w(k, i)f (k, i): f (k, i) ∈ πi(Att(0))
〉
if ci(t)= ∗. (5.1)
In the situation depicted in Fig. 6, the value of c(t + 1) in domain ∆i would thus be
the weighted centroid of the prototypical values in this domain of the active symbols in
symbol dimensions 1 and 2. If∆i were fatigue and the active symbols were “Patient X” and
“iron deficiency anaemia”, a representation of fatigue is activated which is a compromise
between that of the patient and the typical fatigue level of those with the disease, provided
both the prototypical values for fatigue of Patient X and fatigue associated with iron
deficiency anaemia are in the area of attention.
Type 2 transitions raise the activity level of a symbol which has a prototypical value
near the current state, provided this part of the current state is in the region of attention.
The adjustment to the activity level, c(k, t + 1) − c(k, t), would again in general be a
function of the importance of the property to the thing labelled by the kth. symbol. For
example, a fatigue level very representative of tiredness of iron deficiency anaemics might
still only weakly increase activity in the anaemics’ symbol dimension because fatigue is
not an important distinguishing domain here. An example of such a type 2 transition is:
c(k, t + 1)= c(k, t)+G(w)
for each k ∈ {j : di(ci(t), f (j, i)) < δ & ci(t) ∈ πi(Att(0))}, (5.2)
where G(w) is some geometrically-based real valued function of the importance w(k, i)
of the ith dimension to the kth symbol. G might be related to the distance between the
projection of the current state on a domain and prototypical values for the kth symbol,
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perhaps modulated as a similarity judgement to bring it into the range [0,1]. Specifically,
c(k, t + 1)− c(k, t) might be w(k, i) exp(−di(ci(t), f (k, i)), or more generally, for some
positive constant λ 1,




(−di(ci(t), f (k, i))). (5.3)
Of course, c(k, t + 1) cannot exceed 1, so fully extended symbols are not affected by
such transitions. If (5.3) holds, the type 2 transition that Fig. 6 depicts between time t + 1
to t + 2 could only occur if the concept labelled with the 4th symbol had a prototypical
value in domain ∆i close to c(t + 1)—for example, if this concept were leukaemia and
fatigue symptoms for leukaemia were similar to those of Patient X and of sufferers of
iron deficiency anaemia. While the precise form of the transitions will depend on the
application, type 1 and 2 transitions would be expected to be a function of the importance
w(k, i), as was the case in (5.1) and (5.3).
5.2.2. Control and SetAttention
There are two general control principles for conceptual spaces. The first control principle
PC1 says move attention (Att(0)) to the next element (Att(1)) when activity dies out in the
current region. The second principle PC2 says fill the buffer when it is emptied, and do so
according to the current state of symbol space. Specifically:
PC1 : If the state does not change in a unit time period then Att(i)← Att(i + 1), 0  i
< s.
PC2 : If Att is empty then SetAttention(L;η)whereL is the complex concept formed from
the dimensions k in symbol space which have activity level c(k, t) greater than an
externally set level η (or are the dimensions remaining after a cut-off calculated to
limit the number of symbols).
SetAttention sets attention areas and the initial state for the next round of processing.
The attention areas will apply across all levels, that is, across all the copies of the base
conceptual space. However, the operation of SetAttention itself takes account of the levels
of its input. Recall that levels are used to represent conceptual subcomponents, such as a
“flat tyre” on a “car”, or “fingernails” of “Patient X” . The algorithm assumes that when the
structure of complex objects is presented through active symbols set at different levels, then
the objective will be to distinguish them. So it tries to find properties on the domains which
best discriminate concepts associated with the symbols. Multiple active symbol dimensions
at the one level portray, in contrast, a conceptually indivisible thing such as a “anaemic
patient” or “flat tyre”. The algorithm therefore assumes that the objective will be to find
the areas of commonality of the symbols, to isolate the thing to which the multiple symbols
refer. So the algorithm tries to find properties which the active concepts or objects have in
common. These properties are then fed into the multi-layer comparison. All cases require
a measure of the distance between properties, which we implement using the Hausdorff
distance dH defined on the relevant domains.
SetAttention is presented in Fig. 7, for the cases (a) all active symbols are on the same
(base) level, and (b) each active symbol is on a different level. If there are active symbols
at more than one level, and multiple symbols such as “pale” “anaemic patient” are active in
at least one level, then SetAttention first forms the composite concepts at each level, as in
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Fig. 7. SetAttention algorithm. Input is the active symbol dimensions and a cutoff η. For simplicity it is assumed
either each active symbol is at a different level (so goal is to differentiate) or all are at the same level (goal is
to find commonalities). SetAttention finds properties or domains which are associated through the importance
function w with as many of the input symbols as possible. It then orders properties by how common they are to
the labeled concepts on the same level, or it orders domains by how well they discriminate labeled concepts on
different levels, in the sense of separating the regions on the domain associated with each concept. If the buffer is
not full after one such attempt, the algorithm tries again on properties or domains which are not associated with
as many of the input concepts. If it fails to find any associations between any of the input concepts at this level,
it will enter a repair algorithm. If only one symbol dimension is active, SetAttention finds the most important
properties for the concept using the importance function w.
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the algorithm for case (a). Instead of putting the ranked regions, which are the non-trivial
intersections of properties of the active symbols, directly into the attention buffer, it uses
them for the next stage of processing. This is essentially algorithm (b), with these regions
used in place of the regions (properties) presumed to have been associated with the one
symbol active at each level.
5.2.3. Overview of the formation of composite concepts
After SetAttention completes, only symbol dimensions are active. Suppose these
symbols refer to a composite concept, such as “worried person” “leukaemia sufferer”, and
so are at the same (base) level. A type 1 transition then sets the current state in the initial
area of attention, which is the region in the concept domain which has most in common
for the concepts named by the active symbols. The value taken will be the centroid of
the prototypical values of these concepts on that domain, according to (5.1). This change
allows type 2 transitions to raise activities of symbols labelling concepts which have
prototypical values near the centroid, using the definition of distance in that domain. If the
property considered were widely-used, such as “large” on a size domain, or “frowning” on
a facial expression domain, there may be many irrelevant concepts activated. For example,
if SetAttention had operated on the symbols “large size” and “animal”, at this stage symbols
of large cities, large cars etc. may all be activated along with examples of large animals. If
the facial expression property “frowning” was shared by “worried person” and “leukaemia
sufferer”, then frowning people of various ilk might be recalled and their name symbols
activated, through (5.3). These, however, will not cause further type 1 transitions because
attention is on the initial domain (a frowning facial expression, say).
Therefore, under the general control principle Pc1, attention moves to the next region
SetAttention stored in the attention buffer. This refocus allows another type 1 transition,
setting the state over the new domain to the centroid. This time, the centroid may not only
be calculated using the prototypical values of the concepts associated with the original
symbols (“worried person” “leukaemia sufferer”, say), but also prototypical values for
other active symbols, provided they are in the region of attention. A type 2 transition will
then again raise activity levels of any symbol associated with a concept “near” to this
prototype, using (5.3). Symbols connected with worried leukaemia sufferers—such as the
names of patients—are likely to be at highest activation levels, having been raised by each
of the type 2 transitions. Other symbols irrelevant to the composite concept may be active,
but their activity levels would, in general, be raised by fewer of the type 2 transitions, and
so would be likely to be lower. The cycle of type 1/type 2 transitions is repeated till the
buffer empties.
SetAttention is called again, under the general control principle Pc2. The symbols
above the cutoff threshold, for example those naming the worried leukaemia patients, are
activated on the same level, and the properties that they share are ranked by SetAttention. It
is at this stage that a conceptualisation of the indivisible concept described by the multiple
symbols, e.g., “worried leukaemia sufferer”, becomes available for further processing. The
regions (properties) derived by SetAttention can be captured as a new concept, and their
ranking used to define the importance function w on the composite concept.
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5.3. Categorisation example
This section shows how the SetAttention operation, the control principles and the two
transition types are sufficient to solve general categorisation problems. Descriptions of
the objects to be categorised can be presented through the symbol space DL (mimicking
input through the symbolic system), or through the concept spaceD (mimicking perceptual
input, for example visual input through the pre-conceptual level). We only consider the
former case here.
Typical categorisation problems involve a question such as What type of anaemic patient
is Patient X: leukemic or iron deficient?, or Does Patient Y have leukaemia or an iron
deficiency anaemia?, where Patient X and Patient Y are known to the person being asked
the question, or rather, the conceptual system has some associations between the symbols
and conceptual states. Alternatively, the question might be Does this suggest leukaemia
or an iron deficiency anaemia?, followed by presentation of a list of signs, symptoms and
test results for Patient X or Patient Y. Solving such problems correctly requires “enough”
overlap between (i) the properties describing iron deficiency anaemia and leukaemia in
the conceptual space of the problem solver and (ii) their understanding of the properties
describing the symbols Patient X and Patient Y in the first formulation of the problem—in
a sense that will become clear as we work through the example. In the second formulation,
the overlap must be between (i) the properties describing iron deficiency anaemia and
leukaemia and (ii) the stated or observed properties of the anaemic patients.
In the following, suppose the external input which provokes conceptual activity is as
shown in quotations. Suppose further that possible categories into which objects are to be
placed are k1, . . . ,kg . Finally, suppose transitions are described by Eqs. (5.1) and (5.3),
where the importance function w is known to the system. Then categorisation proceeds
with these steps:
“Is the following an example of k1 or . . . or kg” (e.g., “Is the following a case of leukaemia
or iron deficiency anaemia?”).
(a) The symbol dimensions ki are activated from outside the system at multiple levels,
because this is a comparison operation.
(b) The control rule PC2 invokes SetAttention, which fills the buffer with areas in domains
that best discriminate the categories k1,k2, . . . ,kg. Each of the symbols is active at
a different level, and c(t) is set to * everywhere else.
(i) “Object O” (e.g., “Patient X”).
(c) The input from outside the system sets the current state so that just the symbol
dimension corresponding to the object O is active, call it o.
(d) If the conceptualisation of O projects non-trivially onto a property Po,i in the ith
domain which has centroid f (o, i) in Att(0) then the current state over domain i is
set by (5.1) to f (o, i) at each of the levels. Else the next buffer item is selected.
(e) If a type 1 transition has been made, it is because the prototype of property Po,i is
in an attention area. This is a region on the domain which best discriminates the
classes, according to SetAttention (Fig. 7). Given the form of (5.1), the change to
the state is likely to have brought it close to the prototypical values on this domain
of one of more of the classes ki . If so, the change in the state will allow a type 2
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Fig. 8. Role of metric concepts in categorisation. Conceptual space is represented as a family of functions, as
in Fig. 4. Suppose D has domains Colour, Fatigue and Red Blood Cell Volume. The figure depicts disease
concepts, labelled leukaemia and iron deficiency anaemia, with overlapping properties (functions between a pair
of bounding functions) on these domains. The conceptualisation of the symbol Patient X is also as a region (i.e.,
a set of functions) which lies wholly within the concept of iron deficiency anaemia but intersects with leukaemia
on all 3 domains. The categorisation of Patient X will depend on where the centroids of the properties associated
with Patient X lie in relation to properties such as Pleukaemia, fatigue associated with the diseases. It will also
depend on distances between centroids.
transition, Eq. (5.3), raising activity c(k, t + 1) for one or more of the class symbols
k ∈ {k1, . . . , kg}.
(f) Steps (d) and (e) are repeated until the buffer is emptied. If there have been no state
changes to conceptual space, the system moves to a repair/training situation through
the control rule Pc2. Otherwise, one or more of the class symbols will be active (and
possibly other symbols as well).
Note that the “Patient X” symbol will still be active at the end of processing, along with,
say, an iron deficiency anaemia dimension symbol, and a lower activation on the leukaemia
symbol, if conceptual space is as depicted in Fig. 8. These activation levels provide the
categorisation mechanism. The active symbols are used by SetAttention in the next round
of processing, unless there is some external input: specifically, the algorithm will try to set
the attention buffer to common properties of the active symbols.
OR (ii) “an individual with properties O1,O2, . . . .” (e.g., “the anaemic patient is pale,
suffering headaches, has fingernails which are concave, etc.”).
(c) A symbol corresponding to each of the properties is externally activated, all on the
same level since they are part of a composite object. For simplicity assume the
property Qi associated with the symbol Oi labelling that property is on domain i .
(d) If the prototype for a property Qi is within an entry in the attention buffer it must,
because of the way SetAttention has selected areas, overlap one or more of the
properties used to discriminate the classes. If so, when the attention buffer head
reaches this entry, the type 1 transition (5.1) sets this area in the current state to be a
prototype of Qi .
(e) As in (i)(e) above, a type 1 transition (5.1) occurs in (d) because the changed state is
likely to be near a prototypical value for one or more of the properties of the classes.
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So it is likely to allow a type 2 transition (5.3) to feed back activity to one or more
of the category symbols ki which have similar prototypical values to the properties
of the individual.
(f) Steps (d) and (e) are repeated till eventually the state c attains prototypical values
for each of the properties of the object which have “enough” overlap with the
discriminating properties to trigger their associated transitions, and classes with
more similar prototypical values on the domains have higher activation levels.
(g) Thus a ranking of the class symbols is possible through their activity levels.
In this case, the property symbolsOi and the iron deficiency anaemia/leukaemia dimension
symbol(s) are, in the absence of external intervention, left active when the buffer empties,
for use by SetAttention in the next round of processing.
There are three important points to note about the example. Firstly, there is no need
for high level interpretation of the solution on conclusion of the categorisation. The
current state of the symbol space may simply be passed to SetAttention in an endless
processing loop, into which may be injected external changes of state, and interrupts to
current processing causing resetting of the attention buffer using the current symbol space.
Secondly, the procedure is an example of an anytime algorithm, in the sense that it can
be interrupted at any time after a problem has been presented, and a tentative solution is
available for further processing in the current state of symbol space. In particular, this
means that the size of the attention buffer (the number of properties which are being
used to categorise each object) may not be as critical as the time given to the task before
interruption. Thirdly, the categorisation depends intimately on the geometry of conceptual
spaces, as this is used in the setting of the attention areas and in the determination of what
transitions are made, as well as in the associations between symbols and concept state.
6. Examples of conceptual spaces
This section illustrates the definitions of conceptual spaces and the dynamics described
in the previous section. First, dynamical systems are represented as conceptual spaces,
including emulation of their dynamics. This, however, provides limited demonstrations
of the power of conceptual spaces, because there is almost no geometry to exploit.
Our framework is then applied to the geometric representation of conceptual spaces
developed by Gärdenfors [15], which has been the foundation for our extended definition
of conceptual spaces. Inductive inference is the key reasoning activity flagged for the
geometric representation, and this is implemented here.
Another formulation, a two-dimensional version of the example in Fig. 4 which we call
“voltage maps” and which are reminiscent of topographical maps in cortex, is developed
in [2].
6.1. General dynamical system implemented as a conceptual space
Dynamical systems are normally approached from a perspective of continuity, even
when simulated on discrete computer systems. Their use in neurobiology and psychology
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is linked with the activity of pre-conceptual level neural processes, rather than higher level
processes, and it is most natural to model input to the conceptual space representation of
a dynamical system as coming from the pre-conceptual level (i.e., directly to the concept
space dimensions). To input through the symbolic level is cumbersome. The design choice
made here is to model the dynamical system as a family of vector fields on a manifold X,
then to use the activity level of a symbol to denote the real value in a component of Rn at
a point on the manifold. Thus, the number of symbols is n times the cardinality of X.
Definition 6.1.1 (Dynamical system as conceptual space). A formal definition of a
dynamical system as a conceptual space that allows for input through the symbol space
is:
• D − {∗} is a finite family of continuous vector fields Rn on a manifold X, and the
index set of concept space dimensions Γ is X. 16
• For each dimension x,Dx = Rn ∪ {∗} with the usual Euclidean distance, and πx(y)
is the value of the vector field y at x; betweenness on D is defined by betweenness in
R
n at every point on X so that B(a, b, c) if and only if B(a(x), b(x), c(x)) for each
x ∈X and for all x, y in X,B(a(x), b(x), c(x))⇔ B(a(y), b(y), c(y)).
• There are no integral domains.
• Corresponding to each concept space dimension x there is a set of n symbol
dimensions.
• v = 1, s = 1.
Specification of the dynamics is through linking symbols to states in D, and through
difference equations f (−, t + 1)− f (−, t) = ψ(−, t). The buffer is set to depth 1, and
transition rules are used to switch attention amongst non-symbol dimensions.
Suppose X has discrete approximation X′ = {x1, x2, . . . , xN } (see footnote 13) and
dimension Di is indexed in X by xi . Let ki,j denote the symbol dimension corresponding
to the j th component of the input field in the ith dimension. Let ξ be an isomorphism
between the reals and the open interval (0,1). The weight function w(ki,j , x)= 1 if and
only if x = xi and f (kij , xj )= ξ(c(ki,j , t)) .






; Att(0)=Di modulo N+1
}
if Di = Att(0) & c(ki,j , t) > 0 & ci(t)= ∗, (6.1){




, j = 1, . . . , n} if ci(t) ∈ πiAtt(0), (6.2){
ci(t + 1)= ci(t)+ψi(t); Att(0)=Di modulo N+1
}
if Di = Att(0) & ci(t) = ∗. (6.3)
The input to the system is a vector {{ai,j }j=1,n}i=1,N entered as a positive activity level
ξ−1(ai,j ) on each of the symbols kij . SetAttention tries to find common properties and
16 In a discrete representation the dimensions would be a finite subset X′ = {x1, x2, . . . , xN } of X, and there
would be a family of approximation functions Ψ defined on X′ such that for any ε > 0 and any vector field
v on X in the finite family, there is v′ ∈ Ψ and some extension v∗ of v′ to X satisfying |v − v∗| < ε and∑
i=1,N |v(xi ), v∗(xi )|< ε. In the discrete representation, D is the family Ψ defined on X′ .
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will find that each ki,j will be associated with the whole of Di . So it will end up simply
putting D1 into the attention buffer Att(0). The type 1 transition sets the current state at x1
to {a1,j }j=1,n and changes the attention to D2. Another type 1 transition sets the current
state at x2 and so on until the state c is set with the correct input at each node. (This is
the initial stage if the input is received directly at the dimension xi .) Update transitions are
then made sequentially, feeding back results to the symbolic level system through the type
2 transitions.
6.2. Geometric mode of conceptual space representation
Gärdenfors [15] emphasises the value of a geometric interpretation of perceptual
concepts, because of the intrinsic notion of distance. This can be used, inter alia, in the
important reasoning activity of induction, that is, of generalisation based on correlation
between properties. The essential role of induction is to establish connections among
concepts or properties from different domains. The dynamics of induction as generalisation
involve the replacement of unknown values in dimensions with properties assigned on the
basis of correlations.
The preferred structuring of the conceptual space is as a Cartesian product. There is
strong evidence for non-separability of many perceptual dimensions such as those involved
in colour: a group of integral dimensions is supposed to exist when a Minkowski metric
of degree greater than 1 (typically, the Euclidean metric) fits perceived concepts involving
multiple properties better than the degree 1 or city block distance measure appropriate for
separable dimensions. In the geometric formulation, therefore, the conceptual space is a
Cartesian product of domains rather than dimensions. Thus, as well as the distance metrics
on the dimensions, the partitioning of dimensions into domains is a key element in the
geometric representation.
The final key element of the geometric representation of conceptual space as described
by Gärdenfors is the role of connectivity and convexity in properties and concepts, which
have been captured in the definitions and results of Section 3. Connectivity is required in
all regions, used in properties, concepts, and areas of attention. Prototypes have been used
in transition rules, and their sensible definition relies on convexity.
Definition 6.2.1 (Geometric conceptual space). A formal definition of the conceptual
space which captures the spirit of Gärdenfors’ exposition is:
• D = ∏i ∆i where each ∆i is a metric space—a perceptual quality—with a
distinguished point at infinity, and the projection πi :D → ∆i is the Cartesian
projection.
• There is one symbol for each concept, including names of domains, dimension, and
properties; denote the symbol dimensions Lj .
• Domains take the Euclidean metric formed from the metrics of the underlying
dimensions Di , and the relationship between the domains and the dimensions
is determined by the partition {Yi}i∈Dom of Dim = {1,2, . . . ,N}. Betweenness is
induced by this metric.
• v > 1 and s = 1 (required for categorisation).
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Let ii :Di →D be the canonical injection. Use this to identify Di with a subspace in D.
Recall that Pj,i is the property in domain i associated with the j th symbol.
The type 1 and 2 transitions readily accommodate Gärdenfors’ Criterion C for a natural
concept: i.e., as a region over domains which each have a salience weighting, together
with information about how regions in different domains are correlated [15, p. 105]. The
salience weighting is the importance function w used in the transition Eqs. (5.1) and (5.3),
which in this setting become
ci(t + 1)= λ
∑{
c(k, t)w(k, i)f (k, i): f (k, i) ∈ Att(0) & ci(t)= ∗
}
,
for λ > 0, (6.4)




(−di(ci(t), f (k, i))). (6.5)
A class of transitions is required to support induction. Here, we will not change the
associations which define a concept—that part of learning is outside the scope of the
present paper. Generalisation is only performed if the current state does not have a prior
value in the generalisation domain, so that in our setting, data dominates rules. For
example, a generalisation rule that all Frenchmen are good lovers will be blocked if Jacques
is known to be a bad lover. Generalisation rules are related to type 1 transitions, in that they
set a previously unknown value; however, they can be triggered without requiring symbols
to be active.
Suppose the subject of generalisation is domain ∆j , and J is the set of domains to be
used as the basis of generalisation. Suppose further that k(m) is the symbol associated with
the property to be substituted. Then the generalisation rule is







) ∈ Att(0)& cj (t)= ∗&(
d(cr(i)(t), f (k(m), r(i))) < δ for r(i) ∈ J
)
. (6.6)
This says that if c(t) is close enough to some set of prototypical values in the domains
indexed by J , but takes unknown value in ∆j , which is in the current area of attention, then
the current state should be set to the prototypical value for this domain for the supposed
concept labelled by k(m). Such a transition will lead to type 2 transitions on the symbol
k(m), which will raise the activity of the symbol of this property, thus notifying through
the symbolic layer that the current state has been associated with the property. This in turn
can be used in a categorisation problem using the type 1 and 2 transitions above.
We emphasise, however, that the output does not have to be “interpreted” by any higher
level. Generalisation occurs as part of the processing, whenever the area of attention moves
to the right domain and the current state for this domain is not defined. In particular,
generalisation is seamless with the categorisation activity described in 5.3; the transitions
occur if the preconditions are met, in the midst of type 1 and 2 transitions, and the
generalised data is available for the categorisation process.
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7. Conclusion
Differentiation and identification, the fundamental components of reasoning, must
arguably be based on similarity judgements. Similarity and the related concept of distance
are not naturally defined in connectionist and symbolic systems. Many disciplinary areas
resort to feature space representations to define distance and similarity, but such feature
spaces involve strong assumptions about the structure and independence of the feature
dimensions. Moreover, in feature spaces names of structural elements are implicitly rather
than explicitly linked.
Our work explores a new paradigm for representation and reasoning which overcomes
some deficiencies in existing representations. It provides a formal and general investigation
of conceptual spaces which captures the essential geometric elements of their development
in Gärdenfors [15]. Conceptual spaces have been set in a mathematical category of metric
spaces, which does not necessarily constrain them, but opens the way for geometric
intuition based on our everyday experience of our 3-dimensional world, and provides
access to machinery from algebraic geometry and functional analysis. Missing values and
complex objects have been modelled. A symbol subspace has been introduced to support
naming and communication, and to direct the dynamics of conceptual spaces. Properties
have been defined in terms of the associations individuals make between labelled concepts
and domains.
The existence of conceptual spaces as representations with the dynamics described here
is not in question, since well known systems can be interpreted as conceptual spaces. This
however leads to the question: what does the conceptual space formulation add to existing
representation formulations? Certainly, metric concepts have been used for a long time in
representation in many areas, particularly in computer vision and spatial modelling. They
have been adjoined to symbolic systems, and to ANNs through control dynamics. Their
use in conceptual spaces has been described at length in the work of Gärdenfors.
The contribution of this paper has been to provide a comprehensive formal foundation
for a meso level representation in which the metric concepts are developed from the ground
up, without assuming a Cartesian setting. Links to other forms of representation have been
demonstrated. Dynamics have been developed which explain categorisation and convert
nicely to dynamical system and neural network behaviours.
While this paper has added a formal foundation for conceptual spaces, it remains only an
introduction. A great deal more work has to be done to reap the benefits of the meso level
perspective on representation which, for developers of artificial cognitive systems, will
derive from a representation and reasoning paradigm which naturally supports the notion
of similarity judgements, but which has explicit links to ANNs and symbolic systems.
Extensions will cover many disciplinary areas. They include tailored implementations
of the dynamics, and practical application in domains such as medicine in which the
metric representation would be linked to symbolic terminological systems. Theoretical
amplification includes allowing the structuring of domains from dimensions to depend on
the concept rather than to apply to all concepts, and using mappings between conceptual
spaces to describe both learning and communication. The relationship between this
formulation and other extensions of the symbolic and neural approaches should be further
J. Aisbett, G. Gibbon / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 189–232 231
explored. Laboratory experiments are needed to investigate convexity and compactness in
conceptual representations, as well as to investigate non-Euclidean structure.
We have not required that the conceptual space be a vector space, which would allow
addition and scalar multiplication. Nevertheless, there is cognitive support for the thesis
that dimensions should be quantitative, with addition defined. To extend this to include
multiplication over a field (most likely, the reals) may also be justified. Were conceptual
spaces defined to be vector spaces, they would inherit the properties usually assumed
of feature spaces in the huge amount of work on classification and pattern recognition
carried out in many disciplinary areas. So a better understanding is needed of when
assumptions about vector space structures and Minkowski metrics are valid in conceptual
representation.
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